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Stephen J. Schulhofer* 
“We live in a society where the distribution of legal assistance, like the 
distribution of all goods and services, is generally regulated by the dynamics of 
private enterprise.”1 
 
With rare exceptions, existing systems for effectuating the indigent criminal 
defendant’s right to counsel2 range from disappointing to scandalously 
inadequate.
3 
Inadequate funding is the most prominently mentioned concern, but 
often it is merely a symptom of a deeper problem of institutional structure, an 
Achilles’ heel that weakens almost all indigent defense systems, whether poorly 
funded or not. 
For financial resources and other essentials, counsel for the indigent— 
including public defenders, appointed private counsel and lawyers who serve under 
the “contract” system—are typically beholden to the agency of government (in 
most cases local government) that foots the bill,
4   
to court administrators or even to 
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1 Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 53 (1974). 
2 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
3 The subject has generated a vast literature.  One scholar notes that “year after year, in study 
after study, observers find remarkably poor defense lawyering.” Ronald F. Wright, Parity of 
Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 221 
(2004). See also Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime 
but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1843 (1994). For detailed discussion of the problem, see 
THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 80–81 (2009), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/139.pdf. 
4 Funding is not invariably centered at the local  level.   Most notably, in federal cases, 
indigent defense is financed from the national budget and has generally been viewed as reasonably 
adequate. In state cases, indigent defense (or at least some portion of it, such as representation on 
appeal or in capital cases) is often supported by state rather than local governments. See, e.g., 
NORMAN LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE 
193–205 (2011) [hereinafter LEFSTEIN, CASELOADS] (describing successful state-funded system in 
Massachusetts). Federal funding has also supported capital defense units that represent state death 
row inmates in post-conviction proceedings. These models, to the extent available, help mitigate the 
acute cost-control pressure that dominates when indigent defense costs are borne solely at the level of 
county government. But counties are widely responsible for a significant portion of indigent defense 
expenses, and in a number of states, county government must bear the entirety of the cost of indigent 
defense representation.  See, e.g., David Rudovsky, Gideon and the Effective Assistance of Counsel: 
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the very judge who will try the case. Government and court officials, of course, 
have strong incentives to control costs. If responsibility for assigning counsel lies 
instead with a judge, fiscal imperatives may be buffered to a degree; the judge’s 
aim might simply be to appoint the best advocate available. But that priority is not 
necessarily paramount for the judge either. A judge may (consciously or 
otherwise) favor the lawyer who minimizes pretrial motions and does not “rock the 
boat”; a judge who needs to run for re-election may (consciously or otherwise) 
favor the lawyer, regardless of ability, who contributes most generously to the 
judge’s campaign fund.5 
These constraints—grounded not only in resource limitations but also in the 
attorney’s lack of complete independence—mean that optimally adversarial 
lawyering becomes a luxury that counsel for the indigent often must ration among 
clients rather than guarantee to all.
6 
Truncated client counseling,  abbreviated 
factual investigation and quick disposition by guilty plea can be irresistibly 
tempting, whether or not a fully contested trial or a more aggressive stance in plea 
negotiation might best serve the client.
7 
Such triage, however well-intentioned, 
obviously is not always in the best interest of individual defendants, and is 
expressly forbidden by  the American Bar Association’s ethical cannons.8 
Nonetheless, few observers doubt that it often becomes central to criminal defense 
practice, especially in public defender systems. 
None of these criticisms stands as a reproach to the integrity and professional 
commitment of the lawyers who serve the poor. They almost invariably labor 
under difficult circumstances, for scant monetary reward, and they often achieve 
remarkable results by dint of intelligence, creativity, and long hours of hard work. 
Yet even so, systemic shortcomings grievously weaken the capacity of an indigent 
 
 
 
The Rhetoric and the Reality, 32 LAW & INEQ. 371, 394 (2014) (reporting that Pennsylvania is now 
the only state that provides no state funding at all); see also LEFSTEIN, CASELOADS, supra, at 217 
(noting primary reliance on county-level funding in California). 
5 In Harris County (Houston) Texas, where nearly all indigent defense lawyers are selected 
and monitored by an elected judiciary, some attorneys have earned over $300,000 a year from an 
indigent defense practice in which they enter guilty pleas for large numbers of assigned clients with 
whom they have minimal contact.   See Charlie Baird & William S. Sessions, Public Defender 
Proposal Lacks Checks and Balances, HOUSTON CHRON. (June 9, 2010), 
http://www.chron.com/default/article/Public-defender-proposal-lacks-checks-and-balances- 
1717664.php; TEXAS FAIR DEFENSE PROJECT, BENEFITS OF A PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE 3–4 (2009), 
available at http://www.texasfairdefenseproject.org/media/TFDP-Harris-County-PD-White- 
Paper.pdf. 
6 For discussion of how this dynamic differs, and how its ultimate effects are similar, in the 
specific context of public-defender, appointed-counsel and contract-representations systems, see text, 
infra at notes 28–58.  See also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory 
System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 53 (1988) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Discretion] (discussing how 
lawyer compensation systems lead to conflict with clients); Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense 
Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1180 (1975) (arguing plea bargaining 
system puts defense lawyers in conflict with their clients). 
7 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992). 
8 LEFSTEIN, CASELOADS, supra note 4, at 26–31. 
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defendant’s attorney to render effective assistance. The skills that top-notch 
indigent defense lawyering requires often must include instincts for accurate triage 
at least as much as dogged no-stone-unturned advocacy.
9
 
Apart from these obvious departures from the initial promise of Gideon,
10 
the 
current  situation  disserves  sound  criminal  justice  policy  by  weakening  the 
adversary process, increasing the risks to the innocent, raising the rate of reversals 
on appeal, and promoting cynicism among indigent defendants themselves.
11
 
Proposals for improvement commonly stress the need to overcome the gross 
inadequacy of available resources, and this indeed may be the single most 
important deficiency. Other efforts target measures that place the defender 
system’s governing body directly under local government control.12 Yet virtually 
every suggestion for reform takes for granted a feature of the current American 
system that would stand out as even more peculiar to the proverbial traveler from 
Mars—and even to a visiting lawyer from such less-distant worlds as England or 
Canada. That feature is that the American indigent defendant is never permitted to 
select his attorney. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s paean to free enterprise in Fuller v. Oregon,13 
the opinion that provides my epigraph, the criminal justice system routinely and 
brazenly violates free-enterprise principles. To be precise, of course, it sins to this 
extent only in the indigent defense segment of its docket. Fuller’s account of how 
the distribution of legal assistance is “generally regulated,” is not palpably false if 
we set aside 80% of criminal prosecutions (the context in which Fuller itself arose) 
and treat the remaining 20%, the retained-counsel cases, as typical of the whole.
14
 
 
 
 
9 See, e.g., Pub. Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 274 (2013) 
(noting that public defenders in Miami-Dade County routinely engage in crude “triage,” by giving 
highest priority to the most serious cases, to the disadvantage of other clients). 
10     Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
11 The problem was famously captured in an exchange between an inmate and a social science 
researcher: “Did you have a lawyer when you went to court?”  “No.  I had a public defender.”  See 
Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No. I Had a Public 
Defender, 1 YALE REV. L. & SOC. ACTION 4 (1971). 
12     ABA Standards for the defense function recommend guarantees of independence.  See, e.g., 
1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, §§ 5-1.3, 5-3.1 (2d ed. 
1980) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS 2d] (noting indigent defense plans should be governed by 
independent boards of trustees to keep them free from political influence and excessive judicial 
supervision). But the recommendation has not been aggressively pushed. The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit once refused to rehire Maryland Federal Defender Fred Bennett. Circuit Judge 
Paul Niemeyer reportedly argued that Bennett’s aggressiveness might make him ineffective. A 
Baltimore assistant defender described the awkwardness of the situation: “We’re representing 
[clients], but we’re controlled by the court. When the head of our office is essentially terminated by 
the court [for being too aggressive], it’s hard to explain.” See Alison Frankel, Too Independent, AM. 
LAW., Jan./Feb. 1993, at 67, 67–70. 
13     Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 53 (1974). 
14     Though indigents probably represent no more than 10–20 percent of the population, they 
account for 80 percent of those charged in felony cases. See Andy Court, Is There a Crisis?, AM. 
LAW., Jan./Feb. 1993, at 46.   In retained-counsel cases, the claimed dominance of free enterprise 
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Placing the power to select counsel in the hands of the person whose interests 
the lawyer is tasked to represent would tap into those private-enterprise dynamics 
in a context where they are especially suitable and would obliterate at one stroke 
most of the conflicts of interest that presently infect the defense attorney’s 
relationship with the indigent client. It would not automatically draw more 
resources into the system, but its dynamics would tend to have that effect.
15 
And at 
the very least, client choice would insure that if and when more funds do flow into 
the system, they will be devoted to higher quality service to clients rather than 
simply to more generous remuneration for lawyers that judges or court 
administrators (rather than clients) wish to reward.
16
 
The refusal of American jurisdictions to allow client choice in indigent 
defense is difficult to understand in a society that pays almost boundless bipartisan 
homage to the virtues of the marketplace. Yet American courts (unlike their 
counterparts elsewhere in the common law world
17
) invariably dismiss as 
unthinkable any indigent defendant’s claim to have a say in selecting his lawyer. 
Instead, they and the other official agencies responsible for organizing indigent 
defense in the United States simply take it for granted that state control over the 
selection of indigent defense counsel is as inevitable as indigency itself.
18
 
 
 
principles is largely valid but somewhat exaggerated, because judges retain power to disqualify 
retained counsel on grounds of conflict of interest and to refuse to permit defendants to waive such 
conflicts.  See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988). 
15     See text, infra at note 95. 
16     See, e.g., LESTEIN, CASELOADS, supra note 4, at 204–05. 
17 Indigent defendants have the right to select their attorney in England and  Wales,  in 
Scotland, and in Canada. See, e.g., Earl Johnson Jr., Equality Before the Law and the Social 
Contract, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 157, 189–90 (2010) (discussing England, Ontario, and Quebec); 
Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from England and the Need for Federal 
Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 915–21 (2004) (Eng.) [hereinafter Lefstein, Gideon’s  Promise]; 
Tamara Goriely, Evaluating Scottish Public Defense Solicitors Office, 30 BRIT. J. L. & SOC’Y 84 
(2003). With respect to Ontario, see  also William W. Horne, Canada's  Cadillac, AM. LAW., 
Jan./Feb. 1993 62, 62–66 (discussing Ontario plan that allowed indigent defendants to choose from 
among 5,500 lawyers serving on legal aid panels). As of 2014, there were 5,007 private attorneys 
certified to serve on the legal aid panels. Legal Aid Panel Membership, LEGAL AID ONTARIO, (2014), 
http://legalaid.on.ca/en/about/fact_panelmemberships.asp. 
18 Professor Lefstein, who has been actively involved in ABA indigent reform efforts for 
many years, reports that in the preparation of two major ABA publications on the subject (one in 
1992 and another in 2002), “the issue of client selection of counsel was never discussed.” LEFSTEIN, 
CASELOADS, supra note 4, at 242 n.53.  At one time, the Judicial Conference of the United States 
endorsed limited experimentation with a client-choice model, but apparently no such experiments 
have been tried prior to the Comal County initiative. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, INTERIM REPORT (1992), 
reprinted in 51 CRIM. L. REP. 2335, 2337 (1992)  [hereinafter 1992 INTERIM REPORT] 
(recommending “an experimental program . . . in volunteer pilot districts in which certain CJA- 
eligible defendants would get a limited choice of counsel”). See also ABA STANDARDS 2d, supra 
note 12, at § 5-2.3 (footnotes omitted): 
Neither statutes nor court decisions recognize the right of an eligible defendant to select 
the private lawyer of his or her choice . . . . [Yet there] is much to be said for allowing 
the  eligible  defendant,  when  administratively  feasible,  the  same  freedom  of  action 
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Academic work challenging this instance of American exceptionalism has 
been sparse. An extensive literature and case law considers impediments to client 
choice for defendants with the means to retain counsel
19 
but largely accepts the 
absence of choice for the indigent as if it were a built-in regularity of the physical 
universe. 
20
 
In previous articles, David Friedman and I challenged this paradigm.
21 
Friedman and I showed that cost-control, though a legitimate concern, cannot 
excuse the denial of client choice and that other arguments against choice are 
almost entirely bogus. A scattering of other commentators, notably including one 
of the nation’s leading indigent defense experts, Norman Lefstein,22 also support 
client choice.
23 
But the concept has nonetheless drawn virtually no interest from 
indigent defense lawyers and defense system administrators. 
That situation recently changed, however, when the Texas Indigent Defense 
Commission (TIDC) decided to put the proposal into effect on a trial basis. Unlike 
indigent defendants anywhere else in the United States and for the first time in 
American history (so far as we know), indigent defendants in Comal County, 
Texas, will now be permitted to select the attorney who will represent them at state 
expense.
24 
Although objections to client choice should, in principle, prove 
baseless, the effort to implement the concept in a real-world court system has 
 
 
available to the defendant of means. . . . Obviously, if all defendants insisted on the right 
to choose their own attorneys, the administrative burden would surely undermine the 
effectiveness of the assigned-counsel system. But where the requests are few and do not 
pose serious administrative inconvenience, selection of counsel by defendants should be 
encouraged. 
See  also  ABA  STANDARDS  FOR  CRIMINAL  JUSTICE,  PROVIDING  DEFENSE  SERVICES  §  5-2.3, 
comment. at 38 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter, ABA STANDARDS 3d] (stating flatly that “[n]either 
statutes nor court decisions recognize the right of an eligible [indigent] defendant to select the private 
lawyer of his or her choice” and raising no question about the propriety of this rule or its 
justification). 
19     See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988). 
20     See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006) (“[T]he right to 
counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them.”). 
21     STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, REFORMING INDIGENT DEFENSE: HOW 
FREE   MARKET   PRINCIPLES   CAN   HELP   TO   FIX   A   BROKEN   SYSTEM   1  (2010)  [hereinafter 
SCHULHOFER        &      FRIEDMAN,      REFORMING        INDIGENT        DEFENSE],      available      at 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa666.pdf; Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. 
Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting Effective Representation through Consumer 
Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73 (1993) 
[hereinafter Schulhofer & Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense]. 
22     See LEFSTEIN, CASELOADS, supra note 4, at 241–49. 
23     For other American academic commentary in support of client choice, see Wayne D. Holly, 
Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent Criminal Defendant: Do Reimbursement Statutes 
Support Recognition of a Right to Counsel of Choice for the Indigent?, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 181 
(1998); Peter W. Tague, An Indigent’s Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73 
(1974). 
24     Technically, Comal County government does not entirely foot the bill.  In Texas, as in most 
other jurisdictions throughout the United States, indigent defendants, if convicted, are obligated to 
reimburse the costs of their defense.  See infra notes 66–70. 
510 [Vol 12:505 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW 
 
 
 
required attention to a host of details. Some of these objections are intricate but 
largely mechanical; others have called for unexpected choices between potentially 
conflicting foundational values. 
In this article, I explain the theoretical underpinnings of client choice for the 
indigent and the objections conventionally raised against it. I then discuss the 
practical complexities entailed in putting the concept into action in Comal County 
and the prospects for success with the client-choice model, both in Comal and in 
court systems that differ from Comal in potentially significant ways. 
Part I briefly outlines the different indigent defense systems deployed in the 
United States, focusing on the structural obstacles they create for the attorney’s 
ability to render effective assistance. Inadequate funding, excessive caseloads and 
related problems are extensively discussed in the literature and scarcely require 
rehearsal here, but Part I examines these well-known difficulties from the 
perspective of the incentive structure in which attorneys operate. Personal pride 
and professional ethics require lawyers to zealously assist the indigent client, 
without stinting on services rendered in order to please the appointing authority or 
the paying clients whom private defense counsel may also simultaneously 
represent. But Part I shows that in all existing systems (Comal County excepted), 
the attorney’s material incentives point in the opposite direction. 
Stringent resource constraints obviously maximize the tension between these 
conflicting material and ethical objectives. Such constraints often make it 
impossible for even the most selfless lawyers to live up to the best aspirations of 
their conscience. But enhanced funding, important though it is, can at best only 
mitigate this tension. Even in the absence of resource limitations, ethics and 
economics pull indigent defense counsel in opposing directions; indeed, the more 
that defense counsel is generously compensated, the stronger will be the incentive 
to please the appointing authority from which this compensation flows. 
The prevalent reality today is that indigent defense counsel on the whole are 
deeply frustrated by their inability to serve their clients more effectively. No one 
can question that in most jurisdictions, better funding would unambiguously 
improve the position of indigent defendants. It bears stressing that nothing in the 
present analysis casts doubt on the pernicious impact of stringent resource 
constraints or on the importance of ameliorating that scandal. This is one place 
where we really can accomplish a lot by simply throwing money at the problem. 
Nonetheless, better funding and more generous remuneration cannot by themselves 
dispel clients’ mistrust of their court-assigned counsel or the phenomenon, all too 
frequent in many jurisdictions, of lawyers who sometimes lack idealism  and 
simply see indigent defense practice as an attractive source of revenue for an 
otherwise slumping practice. Along with the all-important resource issue, 
structural flaws and distorted incentives must be addressed as well. 
Part II identifies the principal objections to client choice, and explains why 
those objections are largely spurious. Part III begins by describing the Comal 
County setting, including the organization of its courts and the ways in which 
Comal differs from other American jurisdictions in which client choice could 
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profitably be tried. Part III then explains the issues that arise when local officials 
contemplate putting a client-choice option into operation in a specific court system, 
and how the Texas Indigent Defense Commission (TIDC) plans to assess  its 
impact along a variety of dimensions. Finally, Part IV suggests prospects for 
extending the Comal experience to a wider spectrum of American jurisdictions. 
 
I. THE PROBLEM OF STRUCTURAL INCENTIVES 
 
Criminal defense attorneys, whether they represent indigent defendants or 
wealthy ones, must make difficult choices—including decisions about how much 
work to do (whether to investigate factual leads, research legal issues, or file 
particular legal motions in court) and about what advice to render in matters of 
judgment (whether to recommend accepting a proposed settlement, holding out for 
a better offer, or going to trial in hopes of an acquittal). For all of these decisions, 
the client must rely on and largely defer to the lawyer’s advice; it is therefore 
essential that the lawyer’s recommendations be disinterested. Yet, the lawyer’s 
personal needs and goals often diverge from those of her client. If attorney 
compensation is low, defense counsel may forego useful investigations and may 
avoid trial even when there are good chances for acquittal.
25 
On the other hand, if 
compensation is very generous, defense counsel may pursue unproductive 
investigations or hold out hopes for acquittal at trial when a guilty plea would 
better serve the client’s interest.26 
As a result, the attorney-client relationship presents two opposing potentials 
for distortion: the lawyer may gain by devoting to the case more effort or less 
effort than the client’s needs really require. These problems are present to a degree 
in both retained counsel and indigent defense cases but they become vastly more 
serious when the client is indigent. 
For retained counsel, the risk of insufficient effort is diminished, as in any 
market transaction, by the seller’s need to establish a reputation for good service. 
The converse problem—excessive effort—is mitigated because the non-indigent 
client ultimately must decide whether a potentially promising but expensive 
defense strategy (for example, choosing to contest the charges at trial) is worth 
pursuing. Non-indigent criminal defendants may be willing to spend a lot to 
achieve even a small increase in the chance of acquittal, especially if they face 
substantial prison terms, sex offender registration, deportation, or other highly 
afflictive consequences. But at some point, diminishing returns presumably 
prompt most non-indigent defendants to economize on the expenditure of their 
own or their family’s resources, even when funds remain available.  And even for 
 
 
 
25     See Schulhofer, Discretion, supra note 6. 
26     See  Mark  Hansen,  Indigent  Defense  Fee  Abuses  Found,  78  A.B.A.  J.,  at  29  (1992) 
(attributing abuses in Miami's court-appointed indigent defense system to the absence of incentives 
for lawyers to limit their fees). 
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quite affluent defendants, funds will not remain available indefinitely; money may 
run out before a potentially productive defense effort can be fully pursued. 
A second dynamic moderates—in the case of retained counsel—the potential 
conflict between the lawyer’s interest in earning a substantial fee and the client’s 
interest in not spending money wastefully. In order to attract clients, the criminal 
defense attorney must establish and maintain a reputation for serving client 
interests even when those interests diverge from her own. Thus, the white collar 
defense attorney must be known for making prudent strategic choices, not running 
up higher hourly bills than necessary, and not demanding a fixed retainer higher 
than the case warrants. The white collar criminal defense attorney must have a 
reputation for working diligently even when the case turns out to require more 
effort than initially contemplated when a fixed retainer was set. 
Indigency presents an immediate problem for managing both types of risks. 
First, the attorney may expend unnecessary effort because the client—who 
nominally directs the important strategic choices—no longer bears the cost of the 
attorney’s time. This is the elephant in the room that always bedevils consumer 
sovereignty in domains where—as in health care, for example—there is a break in 
the usual link between consumer control over what to buy and consumer 
responsibility to pay for it. As in any situation in which the cost of services sold is 
supported by a third-party who cannot easily monitor the justification for the 
buyer’s choices, expenditure is likely to skyrocket. Conversely, the attorney may 
expend insufficient effort because client satisfaction does not necessarily determine 
the flow of cases and fees to the attorney’s office. If the attorney wishes to obtain 
future cases, she must indeed maintain her reputation, but only with those who 
provide her with business, not with potential clients. In sum, the party that pays 
the cost of indigent defense (the state) bears the risk that the attorney will work 
harder than necessary and the defendant bears the risk that the attorney will not 
work hard enough. 
This section examines the specifics of how these conflicts of interest play out 
and the ways in which they are managed in each of the three prevalent American 
indigent defense systems—the defender, appointed-counsel, and contract models.27 
The details differ, but when the analytic dust settles, the situation that emerges in 
each of the prevalent models is largely the same.  None of these models escape the 
 
 
 
27 American jurisdictions sometimes use only one approach exclusively, but more often the 
basic approaches are combined in some fashion. In the assigned-counsel model, attorneys who 
maintain a private practice are appointed for indigent defendants on a case-by-case basis. In the 
public-defender model, an organization staffed by attorneys on salary represents most of the indigents 
in the jurisdiction. Even in jurisdictions where the public defender handles nearly all indigent 
defense cases, however, a small assigned counsel program typically must be available as a gap-filler 
for cases in which the public defender is disqualified—by conflict of interest, for example. In 
addition, some cities and counties use a “contract” system, in which individual attorneys or firms that 
are primarily devoted to a private practice agree to handle—for a fixed contractual fee—either a 
certain number of indigent cases or all indigent cases of a certain kind that are filed during the 
contract period. 
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foundational problem that the loyalty of the indigent defendant’s attorney does not 
run primarily to the defendant whom the lawyer is ostensibly obligated to serve. 
All of the models largely solve the unnecessary-effort problem, because the state, 
which ultimately foots the bill, maintains direct or indirect control over the amount 
spent and the flow of future business to the attorney. But none of them affords the 
indigent defendant any comparable protection. None of the prevalent American 
systems provides a mechanism for managing the insufficient-effort problem 
because the party that bears the consequences of that deficiency (the client) has no 
say in the selection of the attorney or the attorney’s prospects for attracting future 
indigent defense business. 
 
A. The Assigned-Counsel Model. 
 
In an assigned-counsel program, a member of the private bar is appointed on a 
case-by-case basis for each criminal defendant. Most American counties rely on 
assigned counsel as their primary source of indigent defense representation, and 
those which use a public defender or contract defender approach usually must turn 
to assigned counsel for representation when public and contract defenders are 
disqualified or unavailable.
28
 
The attorney to be appointed is usually designated by a court official or even 
by the judge assigned to the case. In some jurisdictions, appointments are simply 
made on an ad hoc basis to lawyers who happen to be in the courtroom. In the 
more common system, the indigent defendant’s counsel is picked from a list 
established in advance by a court official or by the local bar association. Selection 
of attorneys from that list may be made ad hoc, at random, or in accordance with a 
formal rotation plan. All members of the bar may be eligible to serve, or inclusion 
on the list may require a certain number of years of prior criminal defense 
experience. Some jurisdictions using the assigned-counsel approach have more 
detailed eligibility requirements or a system to screen attorneys seeking to be 
included on the list.
29
 
Assigned attorneys have not necessarily applied for the list or volunteered to 
serve. Most courts have authority to require an unwilling attorney to serve when 
no other lawyer is available, and in some jurisdictions, unwilling attorneys are 
routinely conscripted and represent a significant proportion of all indigent criminal 
defendants.
30
 
 
 
 
28 ROBERT L. SPANGENBERG & PATRICIA A. SMITH, AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIGENT 
DEFENSE SYSTEMS 15 (1986). 
29     Id. at 9. 
30   Madden v. Township of Delran, 601 A.2d 211 (N.J. 1992) (upholding the constitutionality 
of uncompensated, involuntary assignment of counsel to indigents). See, e.g., People v. Otano, 548 
N.Y.S.2d  401  (Just.  Ct.  1989)  (upholding  conscription  of  unwilling  member  of  the  Legal  Aid 
Society); See also David Margolick, Volunteers or Not, Tennessee Lawyers Help Poor, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan.   17,   1992),   http://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/17/news/volunteers-or-not-tennessee-lawyers- 
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Assigned counsel programs use a number of different approaches for 
compensating assigned attorneys—typically, either a flat fee per case or an hourly 
rate, often with one rate for hours spent in court and a lower rate for out-of-court 
preparation. Hourly rates are typically quite low. A June 2007 survey found many 
jurisdictions still pay only $40 or $50 per hour,
31 
rates that are inadequate even to 
meet the attorney’s office overhead.32 
When compensation is based on time devoted to the case, a judge or court 
administrator always reviews the attorney’s bill, and they often reduce fee claims, 
sometimes in a way that assigned counsel considers unjustified.  Typically, there is 
a cap on the total fee that can be paid for a case, and although the cap can be 
waived by a court official in some jurisdictions (such as the federal courts), in 
many others the fee cap is low and unwaivable. In such jurisdictions, 
compensation may in theory be based on the time devoted to the matter, but in 
practice, it simply becomes a flat fee per case. 
Maximums are currently set at $3,600 for the District of Columbia, $3,000 for 
West Virginia, and $2,500 in Florida and Nevada.
33 
But as of June 2007, the 
maximum fee for a non-capital felony was only $1,500 in Tennessee and 
Kentucky, $1,250 in Illinois, $650 in New Mexico, and only $500 in one county of 
Oklahoma.
34 
In Virginia, the maximum is $445 for felonies carrying a sentence of 
up to 20 years, and for felonies punishable by sentences over 20 years, it is a mere 
$1,235—enough to fund less than two days’ work at the authorized rate of $90 
dollars per hour. Some jurisdictions regard indigent defense as a “pro bono” 
obligation, and appointed counsel can be conscripted to serve without any 
compensation at all.
35   
Although the no-compensation approach is exceptional, flat 
 
 
help-poor.html (conscription without pay); Tennessee Lawyers Balk at Defending the Poor for Free, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 8, 1992, at 3 [hereinafter Tennessee Lawyers Balk] (same). Cf. State v. 
Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1158 (Okla. 1990) (upholding system of conscripting defense attorneys in 
capital cases, but mandating “adequate, speedy, and certain compensation”). For an account of the 
problems faced by conscripted lawyers, see Audrey Duff, Slaves of St. Louis, AM. LAW., Jan./Feb. 
1993, at 85. 
31 REBECCA A. DESILETS, ROBERT L. SPANGENBERG & JENNIFER W. RIGGS, THE 
SPANGENBERG GROUP, RATES OF COMPENSATION PAID TO COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL IN NON- 
CAPITAL  FELONY  CASES  AT  TRIAL: A STATE-BY-STATE  OVERVIEW  (2007); see also Martinez- 
Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067, 1067 (5th Cir. 1992) (appointed attorney in Texas capital case was 
paid $11.84 per hour). Mooney v. Trombley, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15298, *30–33 (E.D. Mich. 
2007) (flat rate of $590 per case, which averaged less than $6.00 an hour, was not prejudicial); 
Hourly rates for out-of-court time stand at $65 for Connecticut, $50 for Massachusetts and New 
Jersey, and $40 for Oregon and Wisconsin.  See SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra, at 2–10. 
32 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Jacksonville, 827 So.2d 925, 931 (Fla. 2002) ($40 an hour 
compensation rendered counsel unable to cover overhead); State v. Young, 172 P.3d 138, 140 (N.M. 
2007) (overhead costs for a capital case was $73.96 an hour); New York County Lawyers’ Ass’n v. 
State, 763 N.Y.S.2d 397, 416–17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (average overhead in N.Y. was $42.88 an 
hour, with a range of $26.80 to $62.50 per hour). 
33     See SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 31, at 1–10. 
34     Id. 
35 See State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441, 445 (N.J. 1966) (upholding the practice in many New 
Jersey  municipalities  of  conscripting  attorneys  to  serve  without  compensation),  reaffirmed  by 
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fees or fee caps are so low in many jurisdictions that hourly compensation in cases 
that go to trial is virtually nil. 
Distorted incentives are pervasive in assigned counsel programs. When 
judges or court officials select counsel, they are often in a good position to acquire 
information about attorney competence, but they have few incentives to use their 
knowledge to pick the very best lawyer. Their own interests often can be served 
by selecting an attorney known for taking a “reasonable” approach rather than one 
who is aggressively adversarial.
36 
Importantly, however, this difficulty is 
minimized  in  those  few  jurisdictions  that  permit  the  attorney- 
assignment  mechanism  to  be  under  the  control  of  the  bar  association  or 
a  public  interest  board  not  dominated  by  government  officials.
37
 
With respect to the attorney himself, the problem is to induce sufficient but 
not excessive effort. A few jurisdictions compensate appointed counsel at levels 
that approximate prevailing market rates.
38 
All indigent defense reform efforts, 
without exception, strive for this arrangement, and it is no doubt better than the 
alternative—i.e., inadequate compensation.  But market-rate fees are by no means 
a panacea. When hourly fees are fully compensatory, attorneys may pursue 
expensive strategies and unproductive investigations, or they may hold out hopes 
for acquittal at trial when a guilty plea would better serve the client’s interest.39 
This is a problem for the client if he foots the bill, but it becomes a problem for the 
taxpayer when, as in the case of an indigent defendant, the government does. 
Jurisdictions that afford generous compensation are a small minority, but the 
risks of unnecessary effort and expense arise even when fees are modest. In the 
absence of conscription, low rates mainly draw less seasoned or less effective 
lawyers, because rates below the market median can be quite attractive for 
attorneys who are inexperienced or not blessed with a flourishing practice. 
Lawyers in those situations have financial motives to bill more time than 
necessary. Indeed, those incentives can be powerful when the attorney’s practice 
is struggling.  And of course that danger is exacerbated whenever compensation is 
 
 
Bolyard v. Berman, 644 A.2d 1122, 1129 (N.J. 1994) (“[O]ur [state] Supreme Court has expressly 
held that a defendant’s right to counsel . . . may be satisfied by the appointment of uncompensated 
private counsel.”). See also State v. Citizen, 898 So.2d 325, 331 (La. 2005) (“uncompensated 
representation . . . is a professional obligation . . . of practicing law” but the court must grant 
“reasonable . . . overhead costs.”); Office of the Public Defender v. State, 993 A.2d 55, 75 (Md. 
2010) (“[A] lawyer has no constitutional right to refuse an uncompensated appointment.”); David 
Margolick, supra note 30 (conscription without pay); Tennessee Lawyers Balk supra note 30. Cf. 
Nichols v. Jackson, 55 P.3d 1044, 1046–47 (Okla. 2002) (upholding the system of conscripting 
defense attorneys in capital cases, but mandating “adequate, speedy, and certain compensation”). 
36     See supra note 5, (discussing the ways that judges and other court officials select attorneys 
whom they perceive as cooperative rather than adversarial). 
37     See,   e.g.,   LEFSTEIN,   CASELOADS,   supra   note   4,   at   193–95,   217–19   (describing 
independence of indigent defense programs in Massachusetts and in San Mateo County, California). 
38     Id. 
39     Improper action in such situations need not be the result of conscious misfeasance.  Strong 
financial rewards or penalties may subconsciously color the attorney's judgment on debatable 
questions of trial tactics or negotiating strategy. 
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anywhere near market rates. Hourly fees close to market levels and an absence of 
fee caps give the right incentives for adequate service but they risk unnecessary 
attorney effort and run-away cost. In all of these scenarios, the incentive structure 
exposes the government to potentially excessive defense expenditures, without 
providing any mechanism (such as client choice) to steer liberal compensation to 
the attorneys most likely to deserve it. 
In any event, the compensation arrangements in most assigned counsel 
systems present an entirely different set of incentive problems. With only isolated 
exceptions, hourly rates are low and are further constrained by tight caps on 
maximum remuneration. Accordingly, appointed counsel typically face strong 
incentives to resolve their cases quickly and to minimize the time and effort 
devoted to the case. When the fee is low, relative to the lawyer’s other 
opportunities, appointed attorneys may forego useful investigations and may avoid 
trial even when there are good chances for acquittal. Yet, flat fees and fee caps are 
so low in many jurisdictions that hourly remuneration can quickly drop to the 
vanishing point for any client who does not rapidly agree to plead guilty. For cases 
that go to trial in these jurisdictions, and even for cases that require extensive pre- 
plea investigation, most of a defense lawyer’s time must be offered free of charge; 
after the first few hours of representation, no compensation is available. Under 
such circumstances, assigned-counsel systems forcefully discourage thorough 
preparation, adequate consultation with the client, and willingness to fight the 
charges with persistence. 
In an opinion upholding conscription of counsel to represent indigent 
defendants without any pay at all, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that “a 
lawyer needs no motivation beyond his sense of duty and his pride.”40 Really? 
Though easy to disparage, this lofty and naïve sentiment should not be dismissed 
entirely; professional ethics and idealism no doubt motivate most indigent defense 
attorneys to do what they can to serve their clients well. Nonetheless, nonmaterial 
incentives cannot possibly cancel out the formidable financial pressures that can 
push in the other direction. A West Virginia court saw this point clearly: 
 
We have a high opinion of the dedication, generosity, and selflessness of 
this State’s lawyers. But . . . it is unrealistic to expect all appointed 
counsel with office bills to pay and families to support to remain 
insulated from the economic reality of losing money each hour they 
work. It is counter-intuitive to expect that appointed counsel will be 
unaffected by the fact that after expending 50 hours on a case they are 
working for free. Inevitably, economic pressure must adversely affect 
the manner in which at least some cases are conducted.
41
 
 
 
 
 
40     State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441, 444 (N.J. 1966). 
41     Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536, 544 (W.Va. 1989). 
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The relatively generous jurisdictions, facing the opposite problem of 
potentially excessive effort, rely on reputation effects, along with case-by-case 
review of attorney fee submissions, to prevent over-billing. Review of fee 
submissions has worked reasonably well in the federal courts, where hourly rates 
are among the nation’s highest. But since court administrators can cope with 
the risk of high costs by assigning attorneys predisposed to be cooperative, or not 
reappointing those who seem too diligent, the defendant still needs—but largely 
lacks—some vehicle for effective monitoring of the adequacy of service, even 
when compensation tariffs are nominally generous. 
Only when unstinting compensation is joined with an attorney-assignment 
mechanism insulated from government control (a combination realized at best only 
in the federal system and perhaps one or two states
42
) can an indigent defendant be 
assured that counsel designated for him will be under no pressure to serve any 
interest other than exclusively his own. 
 
B. Public Defender Systems. 
 
The majority of the public defender organizations are agencies of state or 
county government, and most others are government agencies placed within the 
judicial branch. A few public defender organizations are private non-profit 
corporations, which contract with the government to provide indigent defense 
services.
43
 
Many defender offices, probably the majority, are small, employing only three 
or fewer full-time attorneys. But the public defenders in Los Angeles and in Cook 
County (Chicago) each employ more than 400 attorneys. Even the small defender 
offices usually employ investigators, and the larger offices tend to have substantial 
support staffs, including social workers and paralegals. 
Though all public defender systems are funded directly or indirectly by the 
government, there are important differences in the level of government which 
supplies that financing. Resources are especially constrained when funding must 
come from local sources. Yet in twenty-eight states, county government bears 
nearly all the cost of the public defender. In two of these states, Michigan and 
Pennsylvania, local counties must cover the entire cost of indigent defense at the 
trial  level.
44         
At  the  opposite  extreme,  two  state  governments,  those  of 
 
 
 
42 See supra note 37 (discussing Massachusetts and San Mateo County, California). See also 
LEFSTEIN, CASELOADS, supra note 4, at 205–15 (discussing Public Defender Service in Washington, 
D.C.). 
43 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
SYSTEMS: A NATIONAL SURVEY 3 (1984) [hereinafter CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS]. 
44 Andrew W. Goldsmith, The Bill for Rights: State and Local Financing of Public Education 
and Indigent Defense, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 89, 92 (2005); Id., at 107–08 (noting that 
“[i]ndigent defense at the trial level in Michigan is fully financed by counties,” and that county 
government  also  pays  for  indigent  defense  counsel  in  most  appeals,  but  that  state  government 
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Massachusetts and Maryland, fully fund indigent defense at both the trial and 
appellate levels.
45
 
There are also significant differences in the government’s formal control over 
the defender system. Where local counties are largely responsible for financing 
the indigent defense system, as in most states, county officials typically appoint the 
Chief Defender. But in some places, she is appointed by a bar association 
committee, by judges (especially when the defender office is an agency of the 
judicial branch), or by the board of the non-profit corporation. In a few 
jurisdictions, the Chief Public Defender is elected,
46 
an arrangement that affords 
independence from county government and the court but makes the Defender 
beholden to voters who may or may not value aggressive efforts to secure the 
acquittal or early release of those who are accused of crimes. 
Despite these threats to the Chief Defender’s independence, the great majority 
of public defenders are idealistic and dedicated to affording indigent defendants 
the best defense that they can provide under constrained circumstances.  Even so, 
if the head of the public defender office wants to keep her job, she must balance 
her preference for vigorous advocacy with the need to work within the available 
resources while also accommodating the case-management priorities of the court. 
And as a result, the great majority of defender systems are underfunded, taxed with 
grossly excessive caseloads, and unable to provide their clients with even 
minimally adequate services.
47 
Within the limits of her budget, the Chief Defender 
can hire extremely dedicated attorneys, and she will have a good sense of their 
individual strengths and limitations. She is well placed to pick the best possible 
defense attorney for the case, at least if she wants to pick the one who is the most 
zealous and effective. But if the Chief Defender rates her staff on the basis of their 
ability to settle cases quickly without trial, a defendant might get a more dedicated 
advocate by making the selection himself, even if his information about attorney 
capabilities is highly imperfect. 
From a social perspective, there is a need to assure that public defenders have 
appropriate but directly conflicting incentives—to deliver zealous service to their 
clients but to respect the taxpayer’s justified need to assure that the costs of this 
service do not spiral out of control. The defender system solves the cost-control 
problem quite effectively because the government sets the defender office’s budget 
and may even appoint the Chief Defender (directly or indirectly). Once the 
Defender’s budget is set, she will have no choice but to insure that her staff 
scrupulously rations its time, so that her office provides the best possible service to 
its indigent defendant clients as a whole. 
The  defender  model  does  little,  however,  to  address  the  other  incentive 
 
 
supports the compensation of indigent defense counsel on appeal in approximately 25% of  cases); 
Rudovsky, supra note 4, at 394 (Pennsylvania). 
45     Goldsmith, supra note 44, at 129 (Maryland); LEFSTEIN, CASELOADS, supra note 4, at 
193–205 (Massachusetts). 
46     See SPANGENBERG & SMITH, supra note 28, at 17. 
47     See LEFSTEIN, CASELOADS, supra note 4, at 12–19. 
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problem—that of inducing the office’s staff to meet each client’s need  for  a 
zealous defense. In terms of purely material self-interest, the Chief Defender and 
her individual staff attorneys may have little reason to do anything for their clients, 
beyond the minimal effort required to avoid professional discipline or suit for 
ineffective assistance. But of course personal pride and a commitment to 
professional values provide powerful non-material incentives. Most defender 
offices foster a strong esprit de corps and are staffed by idealistic lawyers who want 
to give their best to serve the disadvantaged clients who are dependent on their 
help. 
The defender model therefore provides a distinctive way to reconcile the twin 
dangers of inadequate effort and, conversely, excessive cost. When government 
controls compensation case-by-case, as in the assigned counsel systems considered 
below, some form of micro-level monitoring is essential to prevent excessive and 
unjustified bills for service. In the defender approach, in contrast, the state 
exercises its cost-control function wholesale, leaving “retail” decisions to the Chief 
Defender and other supervisors in her office. Their annual budget permits them 
(like prosecutors) to invest enormous resources in a particular case if their sense of 
justice requires, free of the chilling effect of case-by-case external review. But 
even so, the cost-control imperative must inevitably constrain the management of 
most cases. The need to keep an eye on the annual bottom line may even create a 
more powerful and pervasive cost-control ethos than would exist for a private 
attorney who had to justify a single claim for fees in an individual case. 
For the individual staff attorney in a public defender system, narrower self- 
interest may reinforce idealism in providing an incentive for zealous effort. To be 
well-regarded by judges and by other attorneys, and to open the door to subsequent 
career moves, the staff attorney must have a reputation for vigorous advocacy.
48 
Although the necessary skills and commitments can be vividly on display at trial, 
they are unlikely to be noticed, one way or the other, if the staff attorney makes a 
low-visibility recommendation that her client accept a plea offer.
49 
Self-regarding 
reputation effects may even have a negative impact on the attorney’s 
representation by inducing her to recommend trial in a case that would attract 
publicity or showcase her talent; relatedly, reputation effects can also impair 
representation when they induce the staff attorney to plead out some defendants in 
order to permit better preparation in high-visibility cases. 
In any event, self-interested reasons for effective performance, even when 
reinforced by idealism and office esprit de corps, must compete with office 
attitudes that run in the opposite direction—those of restraining costs and 
cooperating  in  the  court’s  desire  to  turn  cases  over  quickly.    Because  staff 
 
 
 
48 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1099–1100 
(1984) (discussing the need for lawyers to develop a reputation for assertive advocacy in order to 
achieve success within the public defender’s office and then move into private practice). 
49     See Schulhofer, Discretion, supra note 6, at 53–60. 
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attorneys are typically paid an annual salary, they do not lose money by giving in- 
depth attention to a particular case. But public defender offices are typically 
obliged to accept most cases prosecuted in the jurisdiction, and each defender on 
staff accordingly becomes responsible for a large caseload, often far in excess of 
what ethical norms regard as professionally acceptable. Recommended caseloads 
for public defenders range from 100 to 200 noncapital felonies per year; yet in 
Florida’s Miami-Dade County, some assistant public defenders carried more than 
700 felony cases per year.
50 
Even with caseloads at half of this level, attorneys in 
effect have one new felony case every day of the year, Saturdays and Sundays 
included; they can hardly be expected to find sufficient time to investigate the 
facts, interview the client and witnesses, file appropriate motions, obtain discovery, 
and scrutinize whatever portion of the prosecutor’s evidence may be available in 
theory to the defense. Thus, the staff attorney who adopts an especially adversarial 
stance and devotes especially vigorous effort to her cases may win only the 
disapproval of her boss and colleagues.
51
 
The public defender model therefore presents a highly flawed solution to the 
problem of providing sufficient incentives for zealous client service. When high 
crime rates, crowded dockets, and a growing caseload preoccupy a court system, or 
even create a perception of perpetual “crisis,” judges and other officials who 
indirectly govern the indigent defense system may decide that a Chief Defender 
who instructs staff lawyers not to quickly plead out their clients, to seek acquittals 
at trial whenever possible, or to seek the lowest possible sentences is not the 
person whom they prefer to place in charge of defending indigent clients. 
 
C. The “Contract” System 
 
In a contract defense program, individual attorneys or private law firms agree 
to handle indigent defense cases for a specified fee. Although an attorney under 
contract could choose to do indigent defense work exclusively, contract defenders 
typically maintain a substantial private practice. A contract defender normally 
handles only a part of the jurisdiction’s indigent defense caseload; counties that use 
this approach therefore may have several private attorneys or firms under 
contract.
52 
Only about 10% of all American counties use the “contract” system as 
their primary means for delivering indigent defense services. Many other counties 
use the contract method as a back-up system for cases that their public defender 
 
 
 
50 See KAREN HOUPPERT, CHASING GIDEON: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR POOR PEOPLE’S 
JUSTICE 91–94 (2013). 
51 See, e.g., Reports and Proposals, 51 CRIM. L. REP. 1285 (1992) (This reports on an 
instance in which the Fulton County Public Defender demoted a staff attorney because she had asked 
the court to appoint her to no more than six cases per day. At the time, she had been assigned to 
handle 45 cases at a single arraignment session, leaving her only 10 minutes for each felony client.). 
52 See Lawrence D. Spears, Contract Counsel: A Different Way to Defend the Poor, 6 CRIM. 
JUST. 24, 25–26 (1991). 
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cannot accept.
53
 
The contract system has advantages for small jurisdictions with low case 
volume, and it is therefore widely used in some sparsely populated states, such as 
North Dakota.
54 
Cost per case is often lower than when counsel is designated by 
individual assignments and contract counsel have more opportunity than 
individually assigned counsel to specialize in a particular kind of criminal practice. 
Although in theory counties could choose to award contracts to the lowest bidder, 
without regard to the expected quality of service, this danger apparently has not 
materialized, at least not in any flagrant way. Competitive bidding is widely used, 
but the cost is usually stipulated in advance; surveys indicate that bidders are 
usually selected on the basis of the anticipated quality of services offered— 
difficult as that is to measure in advance.
55
 
Two types of contracts are common. In the global-fee approach, the contract 
defender agrees, in return for a fixed annual retainer, to accept all cases of a certain 
type—for example, all felonies or all juvenile cases. County officials tend to 
prefer this fixed-retainer approach because it makes the indigent defense budget 
predictable and puts a cap on total expenses. But this system leaves the contract 
attorney with the risk of unforeseen increases in the court’s caseload, which can 
result from trends in crime, from unexpectedly complex, high-visibility cases, or 
from changes in the District Attorney’s charging policies. That risk for the lawyer 
(the risk of being obliged to provide service essentially free of charge) in turn 
translates into a risk for the contract attorney’s clients—the risk of being 
represented by an uncompensated and potentially unhappy, uncommitted advocate. 
Yet, about a third of all contract programs compensate defense counsel through a 
global fee arrangement.
56
 
The other common model is the individual-fee contract, in which the attorney 
or firm commits to handling cases for a flat fee per case. The majority of contract 
defender agreements are framed in this way. These contracts protect the attorney 
from the risk of unforeseen increases in case volume, but they still create large 
distortions in the attorney’s incentives, because compensation per case is 
independent of the effort that the case requires.
57
 
 
 
 
53     Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United 
States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 32 (1995). 
54     Spears, supra note 52, at 25. 
55 See SPANGENBERG & SMITH, supra note 28, at 13–14. Note, however, that since 
competition between contract attorneys occurs only over quality of service, not price, outside 
observers cannot easily determine whether the winning bid is really the one that promises to deliver 
the most vigorous representation for clients. Critics also charge that contract arrangements sometimes 
induce attorneys to minimize the time they spend on cases and the resources they devote to 
investigators and experts. See, e.g., RICHARD J. WILSON, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, 
CONTRACT−BID PROGRAM: A THREAT TO QUALITY INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES 20 (1982). 
56     SPANGENBERG & SMITH, supra note 28, at 13. 
57     Contracts sometimes permit the award of supplemental payments to the attorney in some 
circumstances.  Id. 
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To be sure, a “profit-maximizing” contract attorney might decide to give each 
case all the time it needs, reasoning that insufficient fees in some cases will be 
offset by unexpectedly generous “profit” in fixed-fee cases that are disposed of 
quickly.  But two alternative scenarios are less sanguine. 
First, even though generous fees in simple cases will afford the attorney a 
cushion that permits her to devote extra time to complex cases, there is no material 
incentive for the lawyer to do so. She will still be influenced, consciously or 
unconsciously, by competing impulses: professional zeal will motivate efforts to 
provide thorough representation, but the fixed fee applicable to each case may set 
expectations in the opposite direction if it is seen as reflecting legitimate 
assumptions about how much time each case is “worth.” Second, and even worse, 
if the fixed fee already presupposes quick disposition and is set no higher than 
necessary to assure fair compensation in such cases, the incentive structure 
strongly discourages pursuit of any time-consuming defense strategy, which would 
necessarily represent an uncompensated drain on the attorney’s time. 
These incentive problems arising in the contract defense system largely mirror 
those in the public defender approach, but with several key differences. When the 
contract price is fixed in advance and is not an object of competitive bidding, the 
county’s expenses for indigent defense are not affected by the zealousness of the 
attorneys selected. As in a public defender model, the county, for whatever it 
chooses to spend, can select the best available defense attorneys. But the contract 
approach is subject to the same crucial qualification that applies to public defender 
systems even when payments to defense attorneys are fixed: zealous 
representation, if it leads to more motions, more trials or longer trials, can quickly 
increase other costs that must be borne by the court. Thus, officials might hesitate 
to choose attorneys known for filing many motions, driving hard bargains, or 
insisting on trials, even if idealism and professional ethics were motivating these 
attorneys to make this effort at no extra charge. 
The contract approach, again like the public defender model, addresses only 
one side of the incentive problem. Because fees are fixed, either per case or per 
annum, attorneys have strong material incentives to avoid unnecessary service, but 
they have few self-regarding incentives for adequate service. Indeed, global fee 
and individual fee arrangements give the contract attorney a powerful disincentive 
to spend time on her indigent cases. In this respect, the contract system poses a 
much larger problem for indigent clients than the public defender model does. 
Public defenders may have few economic incentives for providing zealous 
representation, but apart from any desire for leisure time, they have no concrete 
disincentive to work on their cases. Public defenders may cut costs on some cases 
to free up resources for others, but they cannot take home unspent cash at the end 
of the year. The contract defender, in contrast, is in business for a profit. Money 
saved on defending one case need not be spent on another; it may simply enhance 
the financial bottom line. Perhaps worse, the attorney has a concrete incentive to 
minimize the time spent on indigent cases, in order to free up time for handling 
more lucrative business.  Worst of all, an attorney too busy to take on more work 
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can nonetheless avoid the need to turn away a paying client; instead she can simply 
cut some corners in her indigent case assignments. These problems are inherent in 
the contract model, and they have produced grave inadequacy in many contract 
defense programs.
58
 
The principal incentives for zealous advocacy in public defender programs— 
idealism and professional pride—of course operate as well for the contract 
attorney. But they may operate much less strongly for many of the latter, 
especially if they see their indigent defense contract primarily as a way of bringing 
revenue into their law practice. 
Another factor that may encourage adequate service for clients is the contract 
attorney’s annual opportunity to renegotiate the contracts. Counties must offer 
retainers at compensatory levels if they hope to induce private attorneys to bid for 
contracts and participate in the system. If contract prices are too low, private 
attorneys can simply walk away from this source of business. By comparison, a 
public defender office has little leverage in seeking to resist funding cuts and 
increases in its caseload-to-staff ratio.
59
 
A final incentive for the contract attorney to provide excellent representation 
would be her desire to secure renewal of the contract. But contract renewal 
requires satisfying the county, not the client, and the county’s goals are, of course, 
ambivalent. By keeping costs, and hence next year’s fees lower than those of 
potential rivals, the contract attorney may earn more per case and over the long run 
may obtain more indigent defense business. Cost-cutting is not undesirable per se, 
but it is problematic in indigent defense programs because the client who suffers 
from reductions in the quality of service has no control over the flow of business to 
the attorney who benefits from the decision to cut costs. 
Though the contract system, in comparison to the public defender model, can 
potentially afford defense counsel a better framework for negotiating adequate 
levels of funding and compensation, in most respects its incentive effects are likely 
to produce distortions. The existence of competition between rival firms in the 
contract system should be advantageous, but the potential benefits of this rivalry 
are lost because court officials, rather than clients, control the flow of cases to the 
attorneys. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58     See ABA STANDARDS 3d, supra note 18, at § 5-3.1 (discussing “uniformly dismal” results 
in early contract programs). 
59     See Spears, supra note 52, at 27–28 (describing how attorneys in contract programs adjust 
to increases in case load volumes). A public defender could have powerful leverage if its staff went 
on strike, but defender strikes have legally and politically proved problematic. See Michael 
McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 581, 688–90 (1987) (describing how 1982 strike of staff attorneys at New York 
Legal Aid Society generated political resentment and led the city to insist on including a no-strike 
clause in subsequent collective bargaining agreements). 
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II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST CLIENT CHOICE 
 
As Part I has shown, incentives to stint on zealous representation and the 
potential for client mistrust of his lawyer are inherent in every American system 
currently in place for providing counsel to the indigent. By permitting the indigent 
defendant to select his own lawyer, American jurisdictions could instantly 
eliminate most if not all of the conflicts of interest that now distort the attorney- 
client relationship for the indigent defendant. Despite the simplicity of  the 
concept, American courts and many commentators—including many who are 
committed to indigent defense reform—refuse to endorse the indigent defendant’s 
claim to have a say in selecting the lawyer charged with protecting his interests. 
The argument against client choice has several distinct strands—that denial of 
choice is constitutionally permissible, that systemic imperatives make choice 
unmanageable, and that client choice would ultimately disadvantage indigent 
defendants themselves. A final argument against choice approaches the problem 
from an entirely different direction. Its concern is that even if choice is not 
objectionable, it won’t really offer any affirmative help. This final argument 
insists that resource levels are crucial, that without an infusion of more resources, 
no other reform can yield significant improvements, and therefore that work to 
institute a client-choice system will be at best irrelevant and at worst a distraction 
from efforts that can bear meaningful fruit. This section examines these four 
issues in turn and shows why all of them, on close examination, strongly support, 
rather than undermine, the importance of honoring an indigent defendant’s claim to 
select his own counsel. 
 
A. Constitutional Concerns 
 
Courts have uniformly rejected indigent defendants’ claims of a constitutional 
right to select their counsel.
60 
Typically, that position is simply put forward as a 
truism. Thus, in United States  v.  Gonzalez-Lopez,
61 
a case involving alleged 
interference with a non-indigent defendant’s ability to retain counsel of his own 
choosing, the Supreme Court, sensing no need for elaboration, stated baldly, 
without explanation or citation, that “the right to counsel of choice does not extend 
to defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them.”62 
When courts have chosen to explain that conclusion, the essence of the 
argument against client choice typically has been just that the Sixth Amendment is 
 
 
 
60 E.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006); United States v. Ely, 719 F.2d 
902 (7th Cir. 1983); Drumgo v. Superior Court, 506 P.2d 1007 (Cal. 1973); State v, Jimenez, 815 
A.2d 976, 980 (N.J. 2003); Hickey v. State, 576 S.E.2d 628, 630 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“An indigent 
defendant is entitled to reasonably effective assistance of counsel, not to counsel of his own 
choosing.”). 
61     548 U.S. 140 (2006). 
62     Id. at 151. 
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satisfied by appointment of a competent lawyer, period—even if the defendant’s 
preferred lawyer would be better.
63 
Thus, in United States v. Ely,
64 
Judge Posner 
summarized the Sixth Amendment right in the following terms: 
 
[T]he government’s constitutional obligation is exhausted “when  the 
court appoints competent counsel who is uncommitted to any position or 
interest which would conflict with providing an effective defense.” . . . 
Ely does not argue that [appointed counsel] was incompetent or had a 
conflict of interest. . . . It was not that [appointed counsel] was not good 
but that [another attorney] was, in Ely’s opinion, better.65 
 
Interestingly, Judge Posner acknowledged that conflicts of interest are 
constitutionally unacceptable. But he treated conflicts as objectionable only when 
they involve a commitment contrary to the client’s interests. Economic incentives 
to maximize personal income or welfare, so central to Judge Posner’s academic 
work, were deemed insufficient to pose a constitutional problem. 
We might speculate that the readiness to overlook this conflict (the conflict 
that arises from the indigent defense attorney’s incentive to satisfy the party paying 
his fee) is grounded in the assumption that the lawyer’s divided loyalty is 
inevitable: If indigent defense attorneys are to be paid at all, their fees ultimately 
must be paid by someone other than the client himself. But this  is  simply 
incorrect. Divided loyalty results not from the ultimate source of the funds the 
lawyer receives but from the identity of the party who controls the flow of those 
funds. 
A doctor’s loyalty runs to the Medicare patient who places her health in the 
doctor’s care, not to the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services. A 
private school’s loyalty runs to the parents who use a voucher to cover their child’s 
tuition, not to the state government that supports the voucher. In just the same 
way, the part of a lawyer’s loyalty that is grounded in material incentives will run 
to the judge, court official, or bar association committee that brings income into 
her practice, not to the government from which the relevant official or bar 
committee draws those funds. 
An undercurrent in much of the case law and literature dismissive of client 
control is, at bottom, some version of the aphorism that “beggars can’t be 
choosers.”66         Obviously,   an   aphorism  is   not   an  argument,   much   less   a 
 
 
 
 
63     506 P.2d at 1010. 
64     719 F.2d 902. 
65     Id. at 904 (quoting Davis v. United States, 604 F.2d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 1979)). 
66     See, e.g., Andrew Cohen, What Does the Supreme Court Really Think About the Right to 
Counsel?, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 27, 2014, 2:49 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com 
/national/archive/2014/02/what-does-the-supreme-court-really-think-about-the-right-to-counsel/284 
085/2/.  After noting that the Supreme Court has refused to extend the right to counsel of choice to 
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constitutional argument. But apart from that point, the aphorism simply does not 
apply, because the indigent defendant is no “beggar” pleading for a charitable 
handout. The defendant has a constitutional right to the effective assistance of 
counsel; the state pays that bill not as an act of grace but as a matter of obligation. 
A related form of argument by aphorism is the notion that “he who pays the 
piper calls the tune.” Of course, this is precisely the problem. When it “pays the 
piper,” the state has inevitable opportunities to influence the tune that the 
defendant’s lawyer will choose to play—whether it will be a battle hymn or a 
refrain of harmonious cooperation. Yet no one would suggest that by paying the 
piper, the state becomes entitled to direct the attorney’s trial strategy. The 
possibility that such influence may operate is a danger the state is constitutionally 
obliged to allay, not one that can conceivably justify the denial of choice. 
Moreover, the picture of the indigent defendant as petitioning for charitable 
aid is doubly inapt—and indeed false—because the state ultimately does not foot 
the bill; if convicted, the indigent defendant is obligated to pay back the cost of his 
defense.
67 
Fuller v. Oregon leveraged the American ideology of “private 
enterprise” as a reason to see the indigent defendant as a mere borrower in a 
conventional market transaction.
68 
Having  a  poor credit rating,  indigent 
defendants cannot obtain a loan from a bank or finance company, so the 
government steps in as their lender of last resort. And in a market economy, Fuller 
reasons, it follows as a matter of course that the lender is entitled to demand that 
these borrowers repay their loans when and if they are able.
69
 
To be sure, indigent defendants in practice are seldom able to make more than 
token reimbursement.
70 
Nonetheless, for those convicted but not incarcerated, the 
obligation to repay can cloud all their prospects for compliance with the terms of 
 
 
 
 
indigent defendants, Cohen observes that “[t]his makes sense, of course, on a practical level. Beggars 
can't be choosers even under a constitutional regime.”  Id. 
67 See Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal Defendants Pay for Their 
Court-Appointed Counsel Through Recoupment and Contribution, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 
323 (2009) (noting that, since Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974), statutes requiring recoupment or 
defendant contribution to cost of counsel have become widespread); Kate Levine, If You Cannot 
Afford a Lawyer: Assessing the Constitutionality of Massachusetts's Reimbursement Statute,  42 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 191 (2007) (discussing Massachusetts’s statute that requires indigent 
defendants to pay a $150 fee for court-appointed counsel); Lola Velázquez-Aguilú, Not Poor 
Enough: Why Wisconsin's System for Providing Indigent Defense Is Failing, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 193, 
210–17 (2006) (discussing Wisconsin’s reimbursement requirements). 
68     Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 53. 
69     Id. at 53–54 (“A defendant in a criminal case who is just above the line separating the 
indigent from the nonindigent must borrow money, sell off his meager assets, or call upon his family 
or friends in order to hire a lawyer. We cannot say that the Constitution requires that those only 
slightly poorer must remain forever immune from any obligation to shoulder the expenses of their 
legal defense, even when they are able to pay without hardship.”). 
70 See Anderson, supra note 67, at 332 (discussing problems in administration of fee- 
recoupment regimes). 
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their probation and for reintegration into law-abiding society.
71 
Regardless of 
whether these debts are fully repaid, the convicted defendant (in most states) 
remains legally responsible for the cost of his defense. Fuller—and the persistent 
efforts of many states and counties to squeeze blood from this stone—therefore 
flips on their heads all the moral intuitions that cast the indigent defendant as a 
supplicant. Denying the party who legally bears the cost of indigent defense any 
moral entitlement to designate the service provider whom he himself is ultimately 
responsible to compensate, makes about as much sense as telling the would-be 
buyer of a car that if he wants an auto loan, the bank is justly entitled to pick the 
vehicle he will get to buy and ultimately pay for. 
Obviously, the Sixth Amendment cannot guarantee to every defendant the 
very best lawyer in town. But this is true primarily for logistical reasons. The best 
possible lawyer will frequently be too expensive or too busy to serve. On its face, 
there is no reason why courts should consider the Sixth Amendment requirement 
to be satisfied by appointment of any competent attorney when a lawyer the 
defendant prefers is willing to serve at no additional cost.
72 
And even if a client- 
choice system is not constitutionally required, why should the denial of client 
choice be considered a desirable feature of a sound system of criminal justice? 
At the end of the day, therefore, if the denial of client choice is to be deemed 
constitutionally permissible, that result must rest not on ethics or metaphysics but 
on systemic considerations that make client choice impracticable. In this sense, 
doctrinal analysis of the Sixth Amendment issue largely merges with the 
assessment of sensible policy. On both questions, the decisive issue is simply 
whether there is any good reason (any “rational basis”) to deny the defendant an 
option that he himself prefers. 
 
B. Systemic Arguments Against Client Choice 
 
With apparent unanimity, the judicial decisions not only reject constitutional 
arguments for choice but also refuse to permit client choice even when defendants 
seek that privilege merely as a matter of the court’s discretion. This uniformity of 
judicial opposition to choice suggests that some strong systemic imperative must 
be implicated.  Yet that systemic concern is by no means easy to identify. 
To be sure, judges and court administrators benefit in self-evident ways from 
their ability to control the counsel-assignment system. As already discussed, the 
no-choice regime allows courts, directly or indirectly, to steer appointments to 
political supporters or to steer them away from attorneys who are perceived to 
 
 
 
71     See ALICIA  BANNON, MITALI  NAGRECHA  & REBEKAH  DILLER, BRENNAN  CTR.  FOR 
JUSTICE,    CRIMINAL     JUSTICE     DEBT:    A    BARRIER     TO     REENTRY     (2010),    available    at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf. 
72     See Tague, supra note 23, at 99 (“The importance to the indigent of choosing his attorney is 
clear: improvement in the attorney-client relationship, representation by an able attorney who will 
fight aggressively for him, and the likelihood of greater participation in structuring his defense.”). 
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submit inflated bills or to make excessive demands on court time. The steering 
factor is the most obvious advantage of judicial control but also its biggest vice, 
because a judge’s notion of excessive effort may simply be what a defendant 
regards as zealous representation. Courts must monitor attorney fee submissions 
in any event, and an attorney’s willingness to defend a case in a vigorously 
adversarial manner cannot possibly be considered a legitimate reason for 
disqualification. Indeed, defenders of the no-choice regime have never sought to 
justify the system on that basis. 
The openly articulated reasons against client choice, however, are 
exceptionally strained. Beyond cost control, two systemic difficulties have been 
raised, involving logistics and the need to assure fairness among attorneys. 
 
1. Logistical Concerns 
 
United States v. Davis
73 
is one of the many cases assuming that client choice 
would place unmanageable strains on the management of the criminal docket. The 
court worried that more experienced lawyers would be in heavy demand, 
especially by repeat offenders, and therefore would inevitably be unavailable to 
many defendants who wanted their services. The result would be either a need for 
frequent continuances to accommodate the calendars of these overtaxed attorneys 
or unfairness to defendants who had to be denied the attorney they preferred. For 
that reason, among others, the Davis court concluded that refusal to honor a 
defendant’s choice was “a necessary element of any system to rationally allocate 
assignments.”74 
In Ely,
75 
the Seventh Circuit echoed this fear of systemic chaos.  Ely involved 
an indigent federal defendant who requested the appointment of a competent and 
willing local attorney. Upholding the district judge’s refusal to honor the request, 
Judge Posner reasoned: 
 
The best criminal lawyers . . . limit the amount of time they are willing to 
devote to this relatively unremunerative [indigent defense] work . . . . 
The services of the criminal defense bar cannot be auctioned to the 
highest bidder among the indigent accused—by definition, indigents are 
not bidders. But these services must be allocated somehow; indigent 
defendants cannot be allowed to paralyze the system by all flocking to 
one lawyer. The district judge in this case could not, realistically, be 
required to arbitrate a dispute between Ely and another indigent criminal 
defendant who wanted to be represented by [the same lawyer].
76
 
 
 
 
73     604 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1979). 
74     Id. at 479 (emphasis added). 
75     United States v. Ely, 719 F.2d 902 (7th Cir. 1983). 
76     Id. at 905 (emphasis added). 
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This  “systemic  paralysis”  argument  is  difficult  to  understand.   In 
Ely itself, the lawyer  Ely  wanted  was  ready  and  willing  to  serve.  No 
other indigent defendant was  making  incompatible  demands  on  the 
lawyer’s time. And even if that imagined dilemma had been present, it has no 
bearing on the feasibility of a client-choice option. At worst, the difficulty 
presented when indigent defendants “all flock to one lawyer” is not systemic 
paralysis but only the inconvenience for an attorney of having to say “no” to a 
potential client. 
Can that inconvenience possibly be sufficient to justify the refusal to let the 
indigent client have a say in selecting his own lawyer? If it is, then non-indigent 
criminal defendants should have no right to choose their lawyers either, because 
they too might “all flock to one lawyer.” Busy attorneys have to turn away new 
business all the time. If this is a problem, it is one that most lawyers would love to 
have. And since counsel who offer to serve the indigent can always refuse 
additional appointments, no attorney must ever (or ethically can) carry a larger 
caseload than she herself considers manageable. If there is any logistical problem 
of this sort at all, court officials can avoid it simply by giving indigent defendants 
the names of the lawyers who are currently accepting indigent cases. 
Although the logistical objections to client choice seem hyperbolic at best, the 
universal unwillingness of American jurisdictions even to experiment with this 
approach might suggest that logistical impediments cannot really be so trivial. Yet 
courts, government, and the bar all have self-interested motives to oppose client 
choice in some circumstances, and as a result the mere fact of their opposition 
cannot serve as decisive evidence against its feasibility. Indigents have long been 
permitted to select their own counsel in Ontario, Scotland, England and Wales,
77 
so 
it seems prima facie implausible to assume, without ever trying it, that a client- 
choice option cannot work here.
78
 
 
2. Unfairness Among Attorneys 
 
Several courts have objected that a client-choice system would produce 
unequal treatment or other unfairness between and among attorneys. Thus, in 
Davis, the Seventh Circuit expressed concern that freedom of choice for indigent 
defendants would “disrupt[] . . . the even-handed distribution of assignments.”79 
But why is even-handed distribution a value to be sought? Two possibilities 
suggest themselves. 
 
 
 
77     See supra note 17 and infra note 83. 
78 For ABA and Judicial Conference recommendations for limited experimentation with a 
client-choice system, see 1992 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 18; ABA STANDARDS 3d, supra note 18; 
and LEFSTEIN, CASELOADS, supra note 18. 
79     Davis v. United States, 604 F.2d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 1979) (quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, § 2.3, cmt. b (Approved Draft 1968)). 
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On one view, appointment may be seen as a prize that particular attorneys 
should not be permitted to horde. This assumption seems counter-intuitive in a 
world where remuneration is so often minimal or derisory. Yet it is quite true that 
court-appointed indigent defense representation can generate handsome 
compensation in some circumstances. One is the situation in which a competent 
attorney with a successful private practice can turn over indigent cases rapidly with 
a quick plea after minimal factual investigation. The other is the situation in which 
the appointed attorney has an unsuccessful private practice and finds the income 
from indigent defense appointments very attractive compared to alternative 
opportunities. In either situation the appointment could represent  a  lucrative 
reward that the state should confer in an equitable manner. 
Even under those circumstances, however, unfair allocation is far more likely 
when court officials dole out the prize than when indigent defendants choose to 
confer the benefit upon the attorney who, they believe, will offer them the best 
representation. Indeed, defendant choice would pressure lawyers to compete away 
the excess profits they would otherwise earn by offering better representation to 
potential clients. 
The alternative (and diametrically opposed) reason to value “even-handed 
distribution” is that indigent defense assignments typically are not a prize but an 
ethical obligation or an annoyance, precisely because attorneys for the indigent 
usually are not well compensated.
80 
If attorneys who view indigent defense 
appointments in this light began to attract a disproportionate share of indigent 
defense assignments (because indigent defendants were selecting them with 
disproportionate frequency), their appointments could indeed become an undue 
“imposition.”81 In a  client-choice system run  in  that manner,  good attorneys 
willing to serve could quickly be forced to bear an unfair share of society’s 
obligation to provide defense services to the indigent. 
Yet this “undue imposition” concern, however plausible on its face, is 
completely bogus. Conscripting an unwilling attorney to represent a criminal 
defendant who wants the lawyer’s services (as the “undue imposition” argument 
assumes) makes no more sense than the evil that client choice is intended to 
allay—that of conscripting an unwilling defendant to accept the services of a 
lawyer who does want to represent him. The goal of any client-choice system is to 
assure that the attorney-client relationship is voluntarily chosen by both parties. 
Since any plausible indigent defense system must permit busy attorneys to refuse 
unwanted appointments, no lawyer need ever carry more cases than she herself 
considered fair. 
 
 
 
 
 
80 See, e.g., Ely, 719 F.2d at 905 (“[S]ome criminal lawyers, indeed, only reluctantly agree to 
serve as appointed counsel, under pressure by district judges to whom they feel a sense of 
professional obligation.”). 
81     Davis, 604 F.2d at 479. 
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C. Can Freedom of Choice Harm Indigent Defendants? 
 
Among opponents of client choice, three prominent reasons are offered to 
worry that the free-choice approach could ultimately leave indigent defendants 
worse off. It is said, first, that client choice could help some defendants (perhaps 
the least deserving among them) much more than others. Second, client choice 
could even result in poor representation more generally because (it is said) indigent 
criminal defendants are not likely to assess attorney quality as well as court 
administrators, bar association committees, or other well-informed officials who 
see criminal defense attorneys repeatedly and have a solid basis for assessing their 
performance. Finally, it is said, client choice could undermine the idealism that 
currently motivates many indigent defense lawyers to make herculean efforts on 
behalf of their clients, even in the face of grossly inadequate compensation and 
other resource support. 
 
1. Unfairness Between Defendants 
 
Some courts that reject client choice have based their opposition on the 
concern that granting a choice to defendants in an appointed counsel program 
would be inequitable because defendants assigned to the public defender cannot 
decide which lawyer will represent them. But this argument largely begs the 
client-choice question by taking as given the prevalent practice of denying 
defendants their choice of counsel from among the staff of a public defender 
office. The client-choice concept puts this practice itself in doubt. That said, the 
issue whether to afford client choice among public defender staff can be resolved 
in a variety of ways without impugning the principle of client choice. 
Offices organized to afford each defendant continuous representation by the 
same defender might opt to permit clients a considerable degree of choice among 
their attorneys in most kinds of cases. Offices committed to the so-called “zone 
defense,” which assigns a different defender to each stage of a case, normally 
would not be able to permit choice of counsel in the same way, but such offices 
would afford other advantages that some clients might prefer, such as the assur- 
ance that a highly experienced attorney will handle their case if it goes to trial. 
Finally, a public defender office might conclude that it can best render effective 
service if its supervisors make the attorney assignment decision without any input 
from the client at all. 
Even this last arrangement is not antithetical to the principle of client choice, 
provided that the defendant can opt out of representation by a defender office 
organized in this way and select counsel from the private bar or from a differently 
organized  defender  firm  instead.
82      
The  crucial  point  is  only  that  defendants 
 
 
 
82     When a public defender system was initially introduced in Scotland, defendants were 
required  to  accept  representation  by  the  defender  office. But  because  this  approach  “proved 
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unhappy with the package of services provided by a defender office be given the 
right to switch to appointed private counsel or to a competing practice, just as 
students choosing among law schools may enroll in one that affords a wide degree 
of choice among courses and professors, or instead select one that affords less 
choice but other advantages. 
A different concern about evenhandedness among defendants is that habitual 
offenders, who might have a better sense of the strengths and weaknesses of 
available counsel, would have an unfair advantage. In a client-choice system, 
defendants with poor information allegedly would get poor lawyers more often 
than they do now, while defendants who have the best information, repeat 
offenders in particular, would benefit. 
As an initial matter, it is crucial to see that allowing the knowledgeable 
indigent defendant to select his lawyer does not necessarily disadvantage the 
defendant who is less well informed. Even if we assume that criminal defense 
attorneys can be unambiguously ranked in terms of quality and effectiveness (an 
assumption I question below),
83 
existing no-choice regimes do not automatically 
give the inexperienced defendant an equal chance for the “best” lawyer. In a 
client-choice system, selection by well-informed defendants will tend to attract 
better attorneys and drive out the ineffective ones. Over the long run, even the 
poorly informed defendant is therefore likely to do better than he does in existing 
regimes that contain no systemic incentive for attorneys to value the satisfaction of 
their clients. 
In any event, the inequality-among-defendants concern, even if plausible over 
the long run, collapses the minute we measure it against principles we consider 
self-evident in the context of the non-indigent defendant. If defendants of means 
who are well informed wind up with more than their share of the good attorneys, 
that inequality is a price we accept to pay without question in exchange for the 
value of mutual rapport in chosen relationships and, above all, personal autonomy 
in matters of utmost importance to our lives. Less informed and less careful 
consumers often do worse than others, but our society does not consider this 
difference in outcomes inequitable, even for such vital services as health care and 
retained legal counsel. Should we randomly assign Medicare patients to doctors in 
order to be sure that those who are less informed have an equal chance to get the 
 
 
unpopular with both clients and private criminal defence [sic] practitioners . . . [and] soured 
relationships between public and private solicitors,” it was abolished, and indigent defendants were 
permitted to choose between representation by the public defender and representation by an attorney 
of their choice from the private bar. See Goriely, supra note 17, at 86, 88. Likewise, in England 
(where most solicitors serving as indigent defense counsel maintain a private practice), the Legal 
Services Commission (LSC) began to establish public defender offices in 2001. Where such offices 
have been established, indigent defendants are permitted to choose between representation by the 
defender office or by a private solicitor of their choosing. See LEFSTEIN, CASELOADS, supra note 4, 
at 243 (noting that “LSC decided from the beginning that solicitors serving as public defenders in the 
new offices would have to compete with private solicitors for their clients.”). For more detailed 
discussion, see Lefstein, Gideon’s Promise, supra note 17, at 84–90. 
83     See infra p. 41. 
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best care? Absent very unusual circumstances that suggest otherwise (mental 
incompetency, for example), our society harbors little doubt that the advantages of 
free choice for maximizing consumer welfare far exceed any of its costs. 
 
2. Quality Control 
 
In Drumgo v. Superior Court, one of the first cases to explicitly address an 
indigent defendant’s claim to select his own lawyer,  the  California Supreme 
Court rejected the claim on the ground (among others) that trial judges are best 
placed to know the abilities of local counsel and therefore can choose for the 
defendant a more able attorney than the defendant himself can.
84
 
This judge-knows-better argument merits little comment. Even if the attorney 
whom the judge picks will in some sense perform “better,” all else equal, than the 
lawyer whom the defendant would select, all else is not equal when the defendant’s 
preferences are not honored or never considered. Given the importance of rapport 
and trust for an effective attorney-client relationship, there is little reason to think 
that a lawyer chosen by a judge, or other court official, over the defendant’s 
opposition, will win the defendant’s confidence more quickly or more effectively 
than the attorney that the defendant himself wants. 
Incentive implications compound this problem. Even if the judge has better 
information about the competence of attorneys who practice in her court, she has 
less reason to use that information to make the best possible choice. Indeed, the 
judge may even use her superior information perversely by appointing lawyers 
with a reputation for being reasonable and cooperative rather than zealously 
adversarial.
85 
Any public official who considers attorney effectiveness from the 
standpoint of the court system has reason to value “reasonable” attorney attitudes, 
a disinclination to file complicated motions, and other professional traits that might 
not win the approval of defendants themselves. Lawyers therefore may be 
assigned according to how well they serve the court system, not how well they 
serve defendants. 
The dangers of a disincentive to pick the best lawyer are mitigated or entirely 
eliminated in those jurisdictions (a minority) in which a local bar association 
determines attorney eligibility and establishes a random system for assigning 
eligible attorneys to cases.
86 
The dangers can likewise be eliminated if the bar 
association or some other body independent of government hires a committed 
Chief Defender, who (together with her supervisors) assigns cases to the staff 
attorneys best qualified to handle them.
87    
Even when judges control access to an 
 
 
 
 
84     Drumgo v. Superior Court, 506 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Cal. 1973). 
85     See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 58, at 688. 
86     See, e.g., LEFSTEIN, CASELOADS, supra note 4, at 193–95 (discussing Massachusetts’s 
system). 
87     Id. 
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eligibility list, the impediments to using knowledge about attorney quality properly 
can largely be eliminated if lawyers applying to be included are screened only for 
ability and cannot be stricken from the list in retaliation for overly adversarial 
performance. 
Yet even when disincentives to select the best lawyer are thoroughly 
neutralized in these ways, the quality-control argument against client choice 
remains untenable, for two distinct and equally decisive reasons. First, attorney 
quality is not an unambiguous or one-dimensional concept. Just as patients with a 
medical problem prioritize different expertise and different personality attributes 
when they choose a doctor, a criminal defendant may prefer a lawyer renowned for 
trial skills or instead for bargaining prowess, one known for an aggressive, no- 
holds-barred style or instead for the ability to get along successfully with 
prosecutors and the court. The defendant may feel that he will be most 
comfortable (or that the jury will connect best) with a male or a female lawyer, 
with an attorney of his own race/religion/ethnicity or with one of a different 
race/religion/ethnicity.
88 
Random assignment of counsel from a neutrally 
maintained eligibility “wheel” can only fortuitously match attorney strengths to 
client preferences, no matter how scrupulously objective the attorney screening 
process may be.
89
 
If the judge-knows-better argument were cited as a basis for refusing to 
permit non-indigent defendants to choose their own lawyers, courts would quickly 
dismiss the argument as preposterous. It deserves no more credence in the case of 
defendants who are indigent. 
Can a distinction between indigent and non-indigent defendants rest on an 
assumption that the indigent are likely to be less sophisticated or to have less 
familiarity with the legal system? Criminal defendants often have had little 
previous experience with criminal justice, and the poor may be especially 
disadvantaged in this regard, since they generally have less contact with lawyers 
and other sources of information about professional competence. On the other 
hand, because the poor are disproportionately represented among those accused of 
serious crime, an indigent defendant is more likely than a middle-class defendant 
to have faced charges before or to know someone who has.
90 
The middle-class 
defendant who has used a lawyer to draw his will or to vet his home purchase 
 
 
 
 
88 See Kenneth P. Troccoli, “I Want a Black Lawyer to Represent Me”: Addressing a Black 
Defendant's Concerns with Being Assigned a White Court-Appointed Lawyer, 20 LAW & INEQ. 1 
(2002). 
89     Assignment of counsel from available public defender staff might in theory be tailored to 
client preferences of these sorts, but this practice does not seem to be common (or even uncommon), 
and it often would prove infeasible or ethically problematic (as, for example, if a defendant refused to 
accept a female attorney or insisted on being represented by counsel of his own race).  See id. 
90     Though indigents probably represent no more than 10–20 percent of the population, they 
account for 80 percent of those charged in felony cases. See Andy Court, Is There a Crisis?, AM. 
LAW., Jan./Feb. 1993, at 46. 
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contract is no more likely to have direct access to the world of criminal defense 
practice than an indigent defendant is. The assumption, therefore, that a defendant 
with means is better able to judge attorney quality or to avoid the predations of the 
“ambulance chaser” can only rest on middle-class bias and patronizing 
paternalism. The observations of a student of English criminal justice seem fully 
pertinent to the American context in this regard: 
 
One should guard against the snobbery which suggests that because most 
clients are poor, ill-educated and socially disadvantaged they are 
incapable of making rational choices. Instead, it is fair to assume that the 
poor know more about surviving the system than the rest of us, and tend 
to be more adept at recognizing condescension or disrespect. 
91
 
 
Like many other reasons offered for opposition to client choice, the judge- 
knows-better argument instantly collapses if considered through the lens of the 
values we honor without hesitation outside the indigent defense context. Absent 
special “market-failure” conditions, a voluntarily chosen transaction between seller 
and customer is the essential Econ-101 prerequisite to maximizing the welfare of 
all parties concerned. Yet the situation in indigent defense is analogous to one in 
which senior citizens suffering from serious illness could receive state-funded 
treatment under Medicare only if they accepted a particular doctor designated by a 
government bureaucrat. The economic and medical efficacy of such an 
arrangement is dubious, to say the least, and its political acceptability can safely 
and without hyperbole be placed exactly at zero. 
The denial of choice to the indigent defendant in need of legal services not 
only violates free-market principles in just the same way, but in two respects it is 
far worse.  First, the indigent criminal defendant seeks services that are afforded as 
a matter of constitutional right, a status that, for better or worse, neither our courts 
nor our political branches have ever contemplated extending to health care. And 
unlike the situation that would obtain if Medicare recipients were denied the option 
to choose their own doctor, in criminal defense the government’s privilege to 
designate the provider is infected by a profound conflict of interest: the agency that 
chooses the lawyer charged with protecting the individual from the abuse of state 
power is almost always tied, directly or indirectly, to the same authority that is 
seeking to deploy that power in order to take away the individual’s liberty. 
Because different defendants face different tactical problems, they may prefer 
attorneys known for different styles and skills. One especially crucial determinant 
of lawyer quality is trust, and trust is often based on a prior relationship. In Ely,
92 
the defendant sought the appointment of Lawyer A, who had represented him well 
 
 
 
91     Tamara Goriely, Revisiting the Debate over Criminal Legal Aid Delivery Models: Viewing 
International Experience from a British Perspective, 5 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 7, 23 (1998). 
92     United States v. Ely, 719 F.2d 902 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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in the past. The Seventh Circuit decision forced Ely to accept the services of 
Lawyer B, on the assumption that some other defendant might also want Lawyer 
A’s services. Yet, for all we know, that hypothetical defendant might have had a 
prior relationship with B and preferred the lawyer (B) whom Ely was trying to get 
rid of. 
The Seventh Circuit decision inflicts Lawyer B on Ely and inflicts Lawyer A 
on the other (hypothetical) defendant, even though each defendant may prefer the 
“Pareto optimal” swap. As in most other areas of economic activity, allocation by 
official decision prevents mutually beneficial gains from free market exchange 
unimpeded by legal obstacles. Judge Posner, perhaps more than any other modern 
jurist or legal academic, deserves credit for winning legal and social recognition 
for this principle. There is no evident reason why it should not be given at least as 
much weight in the criminal defense context as elsewhere. 
 
3. Defense Counsel Idealism 
 
In the current indigent defense environment, many idealistic and 
exceptionally able lawyers volunteer to help serve the poor, in return for 
remuneration well below what they could earn in other fields of law. If client 
choice makes the profit motive more conspicuous in indigent defense practice, 
would fewer of these highly motivated attorneys lawyers be attracted to work in 
the field of indigent criminal defense? Because attorney idealism currently plays 
such a large role in assuring that the quality of indigent defense representation 
drops no lower than its current levels, anything that might undercut that idealism 
represents a danger to be taken quite seriously. 
The simple answer, however, is that the client-choice approach does not in 
any way make the profit motive more important in indigent defense practice than it 
already is. The heart of the client-choice concept is not profit maximization per se, 
but mutual trust and confidence, fostered by making the  attorney-client 
relationship voluntary for both parties. As a result, nothing in the client-choice 
concept prevents excellent attorneys with highly successful private practices from 
continuing to place their names on the list of lawyers available to accept indigent 
defense appointments. Similarly, nothing would prevent bar  association 
committees from establishing or maintaining nonprofit defender organizations that 
would hire idealistic lawyers on salary. Such nonprofits already exist in several 
jurisdictions, and presumably they would have no need to revise their charters or 
their central philosophical commitments and esprit. A Public Defender run as an 
agency of state or local government could likewise accentuate an ethos of public 
service when it recruits, trains and supervises its staff. 
In a client-choice approach, non-profit defender organizations and successful 
lawyers who offer their services pro bono should have no difficulty attracting 
indigent clients when the quality of their representation reflects their  ideals. 
Indeed a client-choice model would systematically favor idealistic lawyers and 
public defenders over profit-oriented firms.  The reason is that an ethos of public 
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service would allow non-profit defender agencies and practice groups to recruit 
excellent, altruistic lawyers at salaries well below what such lawyers could earn 
elsewhere. That advantage over profit-oriented firms in terms of outlay  for 
attorney compensation would enable the idealistic practice group or service- 
oriented Public Defender, even when having comparable revenue from a 
comparable number of indigent defense clients, to hire larger staffs, to provide 
more support services and to maintain lower lawyer-client caseload ratios than 
profit-oriented firms could offer. 
In short, the dynamics of voluntary choice in a “free market” should insure 
that idealism and an altruistic commitment to serving the poor would play a larger 
role in indigent defense representation than they do at present. 
 
D. Can a System of Client-Choice Affirmatively Help Indigent Defendants? 
 
A final argument against the client-choice model suggests that this approach, 
even if not actually harmful to clients, cannot really offer them any meaningful 
help. This argument stresses the egregious underfunding of indigent defense in 
virtually every jurisdiction and emphasizes that unless more resources are made 
available, no other reform can yield any discernible benefit for the indigent 
defendant. And conversely, if a substantial infusion of additional resources is 
forthcoming, indigent defense systems then will be in a position to deliver 
respectable services, the argument goes, even if the currently universal no-choice 
system is maintained; under those circumstances, it is claimed, there will no longer 
be any need to consider undertaking the complexities of a client-choice approach. 
Like other arguments against the client-choice model, this objection is on its 
face quite plausible. But on close examination, it proves unconvincing and indeed 
fundamentally misdirected. Contrary to the thrust of this concern, freedom of 
choice for the indigent client is a critical element in any effort to improve the 
delivery of indigent defense services. 
Consider first, the more depressing scenario—the one in which the resources 
available for indigent defense remain grossly inadequate. Under these 
circumstances, the pool of attorneys who represent indigent defendants will 
continue to include, on the one hand, excellent lawyers who serve out of a sense of 
obligation or altruism and, on the other, minimally competent or relatively 
unsuccessful attorneys  who have few alternative practice options. Because a 
viable client-choice system requires that the  attorney-client  relationship  be 
fully voluntary and mutually chosen, conscription of  unwilling  attorneys  to 
serve can be no more acceptable than involuntary assignment of defendants to 
counsel whom they do not want. It might seem, therefore, that low resource levels, 
when combined with the elimination of attorney conscription, would reduce the 
proportion of indigency cases handled by the very best attorneys. 
Once put into effect, however, a client-choice system is more likely to have 
the opposite impact. The only lawyers who would drop out of the indigent defense 
pool under these circumstances would be those who prefer not to be appointed. 
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These unwilling or unenthusiastic defense attorneys are precisely the ones who are 
most likely to seek ways to cut corners in factual investigation, client counseling, 
and plea negotiation, so that they can minimize the time they are obliged to devote 
to indigent clients. The end of conscription would not preclude able attorneys 
from serving at below-market rates. To the contrary, the absence of conscription 
would help insure that the attorneys who serve are participating out of idealism and 
genuine concern for client interests. 
Nonetheless, if resource levels stay low, less able attorneys will remain in the 
pool of providers as well, and under those circumstances, prospects for effective 
assistance for the defendants they represent can be dim. It is therefore important to 
see that in this worst of the worst-case scenarios (minimal resources and a large 
proportion of minimally competent attorneys) client choice becomes an especially 
advantageous safeguard. Client choice gives the less successful attorneys, who 
may place particularly high value on indigent defense assignments, a strong 
incentive to please their clients in order to continue to attract this much-appreciated 
source of business.  At the same time, the choice option gives indigent defendants 
a means to escape from the worst (or least trusted lawyers) and gives these 
defendants some reason to have confidence in an attorney whom they have decided 
to accept. 
Although client choice therefore has value even when resource levels remain 
low, there is one respect in which one might worry that a choice system could sap 
some of the political pressure to provide better funding for the system. It might be 
argued that Public Defender agencies now provide an organized political voice for 
the allocation of more resources to indigent defense. As a result, if a choice 
system led to shrinkage of the public defender caseload and staff by diverting more 
cases to the private bar, this current source of pressure for funds  to  support 
indigent defense would be weakened. 
We might doubt, however, whether public defender agencies now  wield 
potent political power, and in any event other sources of pressure for indigent 
defense funding (such as the National Legal Aid and Defender Association and the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys) would remain as strong or 
stronger than before. Indeed, if the private bar came to have a greater stake in 
indigent defense practice, there is no reason to think that these private attorneys 
would be less effective than public defenders in lobbying government to support 
indigent defense more generously. If anything, the track record of military 
contractors and private prison corporations suggests that firms selling goods and 
services to the government for profit do not lack for success in winning political 
support. 
Moreover, there are other reasons to expect that the choice model will tend to 
bring more resources into the indigent defense system, not less. Client choice, 
combined with a ban on attorney conscription, will make the inadequacy of a 
jurisdiction’s current funding levels more visible. Such jurisdictions, faced with a 
shortage of attorneys willing to serve at prevailing rates, would need to induce 
more attorneys to serve the indigent voluntarily, lest case processing grind to a 
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halt. That imperative, driven by the needs of prosecutors and court officials 
themselves, would then become a source of powerful pressure to allocate more 
resources, raise hourly compensation rates and the like. In addition, because cases 
handled by assigned counsel, who lack public-defender economies of scale, usually 
result in higher per-case expenditure than do cases handled in a defender office, 
governments would have a strong incentive to ameliorate the public defender’s 
shortage of resources, so that clients would opt for the form of representation most 
likely to minimize overall indigent defense costs for local government. 
Norman Lefstein suggests, moreover, that client choice, far from weakening 
the public defender’s political voice and power, is likely to have just the opposite 
effect. An overloaded attorney in a public defender office would no longer need to 
file a motion seeking court permission to decline cases and would no longer need 
to fear disapproval of her superiors if she sought to do so, because clients would 
solve her problem for her by opting for representation by a private attorney instead. 
And once a choice system began to permit indigent clients to shun overtaxed 
public defenders, defender offices lacking for resources would be forced “to 
become more aggressive and perhaps more convincing in seeking additional 
financial support.”93 
Finally, consider the most optimistic scenario—the one in which resource 
levels somehow rise, with or without the impetus provided by a client-choice 
system. With increased funding, indigent defendants would presumably be better 
represented. Even so, client choice would remain a crucial safeguard. Public 
defenders and appointed attorneys would discover that they were able, perhaps for 
the first time, to devote adequate effort to their cases. And if idealistic, these 
attorneys would need no other reason to take advantage of the opportunity.  But in 
a no-choice model, indigent defense attorneys still would have no material 
incentive to do so. Unless strongly motivated by an altruistic commitment to 
serving the poor, they have no affirmative reason—in a no-choice system—to do 
the best possible job for their clients.
94 
In fact, if indigent appointments become 
financially attractive and if public defender salaries are raised to more nearly 
approach market levels, the attorneys involved will have even stronger reasons 
than at present to win the approval of the government officials, judges, and court 
administrators  upon  whom  their  positions  and  financially  attractive  practice 
 
 
 
 
93     LEFSTEIN, CASELOADS, supra note 4, at 248. 
94     Cf. Carol S. Steiker, Gideon at Fifty: A Problem of Political Will, 122 YALE L.J. 2694, 
2700 (2013).  Steiker cautioned that: 
Even adequate resources . . . would not be sufficient to solve some of the structural 
problems that undergird the country’s indigent defense crisis. The lack of adequate 
organization, training, and oversight of indigent defense lawyers by experienced leaders; 
the lack of crucial independence from the political and judicial branches that many such 
lawyers and public defense organizations face; and the absence of a robust culture of client- 
centered, zealous advocacy all prevent the delivery of decent indigent defense services just 
as surely as the lack of adequate material resources. 
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opportunities depend. Thus, even in circumstances characterized by ample 
funding, client choice will remain essential to guarantee that the attorney’s top 
priority is to satisfy her client rather than the court. 
Client choice likewise would remain essential, even under conditions  of 
ample funding, to ensure that clients were aware of where the loyalties of assigned 
counsel or their public defender would lie, so that defendants would have 
confidence in their attorney’s commitment to them. Norman Lefstein observes that 
the head of the public defender office in Edinburgh, Scotland, fully supported the 
arrangements permitting indigent defendants to decide whether to be represented 
by his office or by a private solicitor instead, because he “was convinced that trust 
and confidence in his solicitors would be greatly enhanced if they were selected by 
clients instead of being assigned by the courts.”95 
In sum, constrained resources, vulnerable financial support, and/or implicit 
conflicts of interest are embedded in the basic structure of all assigned counsel 
arrangements, public defender systems, and virtually any other approach in which 
the defendant is allowed no say in selecting the attorney who will represent him. 
Both theory and practical considerations, in so far as we can speculate about them, 
all suggest that a client-choice model would generate unequivocal gains for 
indigent defendants and for the adversary system as a whole. But theory, even 
when combined with common sense appreciation of realities on the ground, is no 
substitute for actual experience. Therefore, the ultimate test of a client-choice 
model is its ability to succeed in the crucible of a complex working court 
environment. The next section describes the effort to meet this test by 
implementing a client-choice approach in Comal County, Texas. 
 
 
III. IMPLEMENTATION IN TEXAS 
 
A. The Texas System(s) for Delivering Indigent Defense Services 
 
Criminal court organization in Texas is highly decentralized. In each of the 
state’s 254 counties, local trial judges determine most details of docketing, 
caseflow, and case processing, subject only to general requirements, broadly 
outlined in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Each county formulates its own 
indigent defense plan, tailored to local circumstances and the preferences of the 
 
 
 
95 LEFSTEIN, CASELOADS, supra note 4, at 244. Lefstein notes that the Scottish system 
initially assigned some indigent defendants to the public defender while permitting others to get 
representation from a private solicitor of their choosing. During the period when this system was in 
place, “clients consistently registered lower ‘levels of trust and confidence’ in their public defender 
solicitors compared to clients who selected their own private solicitors.” Id. Largely for that reason, 
the practice of assigning some defendants to the public defender was halted in 2000, and public 
defender solicitors were thereafter required to compete with private solicitors for the business of 
indigent criminal-defense clients. 
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judges serving in its District Courts (which handle felony cases) and its County 
Courts at Law (which process misdemeanors). And until recently, each county 
bore responsibility for paying the entirety of its indigent defense budget. Today 
that situation has been modestly alleviated; state funding now defrays 
approximately 13% of county expenditures for indigent defense.
96
 
Though many fundamentals of assigning counsel to the indigent are similar 
from one Texas county to another, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that the 
state has, in effect, 254 distinct systems for providing representation to indigent 
criminal defendants. And there is variation even between various courts within a 
given county. Jennifer Laurin describes the state as having “hundreds of indigent 
defense micro-systems.”97 
The public defender model is a comparative rarity in Texas, even in its larger 
cities. Dallas County is an exception. With an estimated 2013 population of 
approximately 2.4 million, Dallas has long had a substantial Public Defender 
Office; in 2013, the office handled over 43,000 juvenile, misdemeanor and non- 
capital felony cases, comprising approximately two-thirds of the total Dallas 
County indigent caseload (but accounting for just under one-half of all 
expenditures for indigent defense).
98 
In contrast, nearby Tarrant County (Fort 
Worth) with an estimated 2013 population of approximately 1.8 million, has no 
public defender; all of the county’s indigent criminal defendants (28,225 of them 
in 2013) are represented by appointed counsel.
99
 
Other than Dallas, only El Paso relies on a public defender for the bulk of 
indigent defense representation. In 2013, El Paso County had 19,138 indigent 
cases, 53% of which (including two capital murder cases) were handled by its 
public defender.
100
 
Harris County, with an estimated 2013 population of 4.3 million, is home to 
Houston, the largest city in Texas and the fourth largest city in the United States; 
 
 
 
96     See  Jennifer  E.  Laurin,  Gideon  by  the  Numbers:  The  Emergence  of  Evidence-Based 
Practice in Indigent Defense 12 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 325 (2015). 
97     Id. at 16 n.104. 
98     In 2013, the Dallas County public defender handled 43,407 cases on a budget of slightly 
under  $11,795,000;  24,111  cases  were  handled  by  assigned  counsel  for  fees  totaling  nearly 
$14,296,000. No cases were handled by contract counsel. See Texas Indigent Defense Commission, 
Dallas County Dashboard, http://tidc.tamu.edu/public.net/Pages/CountyDashboard.aspx?cn=Dallas 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2013). In accordance with the norm generally observed throughout the world of 
indigent defense, average cost per case was substantially lower for public defender cases ($272) than 
for those handled by assigned counsel ($593), though this crude comparison does not account for 
possible differences in case complexity between the two groups of cases.  Id. 
99 See Texas Indigent Defense Commission, Tarrant County Dashboard, 
http://tidc.tamu.edu/public.net/Pages/CountyDashboard.aspx?cn=Tarrant (last visited Oct. 12, 2013). 
For an expenditure of $14,390,084.40, Tarrant County’s appointed-counsel cost per case averaged 
$510. Id. 
100 See Texas Indigent Defense Commission, El Paso County Dashboard, 
http://tidc.tamu.edu/public.net/Reports/CountyFinancialReport.aspx?cid=71&fy=2013 (last visited 
May 18, 2015). 
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yet it had no public defender until 2011. In that year, the newly established 
defender office handled only 611 of the county’s 75,000 cases. By 2013, the 
Harris County Public Defender Office had grown, but appointed counsel still 
represented 84% of Harris County’s indigent criminal defendants; contract counsel 
represented another 10%.
101 
Public defenders handled 4,600 cases, still only 6% of 
the county’s indigent defense total,102 and the local bench and bar continue to 
mount strong resistance to permitting further growth in the share of indigent 
criminal defendants represented by the public defender.
103 
In part because 
expenditure per case for assigned-counsel representation has traditionally been so 
low in Houston, the public defender’s average case processing cost has been 
significantly higher, an inversion of the pattern usually found elsewhere.
104
 
Travis County (Austin), with a 2013 population of 1.1 million is an 
intermediate case. Like Dallas, it has long had a public defender, but the Travis 
office’s caseload has always been small; in 2013 it handled only 11% of the 
county’s 28,000 indigent defense cases.105 And unlike the similarly small Harris 
County Public Defender, which handles a mix of juvenile cases, misdemeanors and 
non-capital felonies, the Travis Public Defender’s docket is largely confined to 
juvenile cases, with a smattering of misdemeanors but no felonies.
106
 
In the other large counties, a public defender, if available at all, represents 
only a small fraction of the indigent defendants.   In 2013, Bexar County (San 
 
 
 
 
101 See Texas Indigent Defense Commission, Harris County Dashboard, 
http://tidc.tamu.edu/public.net/Pages/CountyDashboard.aspx?cn=Harris (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) 
[hereinafter Harris County Dashboard]. 
102   Id. 
103   See Laurin, supra note 96. 
104 In 2013, costs per case averaged $1,930 for the public defender and only $338 for the 
county’s combined contract-counsel and assigned-counsel cases. Harris County Dashboard, supra 
note 101.  Harris County has a substantial volume of capital cases (67 indigent capital cases in 2013), 
but the public defender’s relatively high average cost per case was not due to capital representation; 
all of Harris County indigent capital cases were handled by assigned counsel. Conversely, the $338 
average cost for assigned and contract-cases might seem remarkable considering that these attorneys 
provided representation for 67 capital defendants. But since those cases accounted for only 1% of all 
assigned and contract-cases, the much larger expenses incurred in these cases had little impact on the 
average cost for indigent cases overall. In 2013, the costs per case of representing indigent capital 
defendants in Harris County averaged $24,113 for counsel fees, $3,634 for investigators, and $4,087 
for expert witnesses.  Id. 
105 See Texas Indigent Defense Commission, Travis County Dashboard, 
http://tidc.tamu.edu/public.net/Pages/CountyDashboard.aspx?cn=Travis (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) 
[hereinafter Travis County Dashboard]. As in Harris County, costs per case in Travis differ from the 
usual pattern, averaging $659 for the county’s public defender and $263 for its assigned counsel 
cases. Id. In 2013, Travis County had 27 capital murder cases (just under 1% of its total caseload), 
and all the indigent capital cases were handled by assigned counsel. The costs of representing each 
indigent capital defendant were dramatically lower than in Harris, averaging $3,038 for counsel fees, 
with no significant expenditure (on average) for capital-case investigators and expert witnesses ($56 
and $98 per case respectively).  Id. 
106   Id. 
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Antonio) had nearly 40,000 cases, but only 2% of them (640 cases, almost all 
misdemeanors) were handled by the public defender. In the same year, a public 
defender handled 24% of the 14,800 cases in Hidalgo County and 11% of the 
8,100 cases in Cameron County (Brownsville). Most of the remaining counties of 
significant size, such as Galveston and Lubbock (7,764 and 7,020 indigent 
defendants in 2013 respectively), rely entirely on appointed counsel, as do nearly 
all of the many smaller counties.
107
 
 
B. The Texas Indigent Defense Commission 
 
In response to intense dissatisfaction with Texas’s overly decentralized and 
chronically underfunded approach to indigent defense, the Texas legislature 
established a state-wide agency in 2001.
108 
The Texas Indigent Defense 
Commission (TIDC) operates under the direction of a governing board chaired by 
the Presiding Judge of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and consisting of 
thirteen members, eight (primarily appellate judges) serving ex officio and five 
appointed by the governor. 
TIDC was granted no authority to coordinate or approve local indigent 
defense plans; the counties and their local judges retained complete autonomy. 
But TIDC was charged with providing counties with both technical support and 
(limited) financial assistance, in order to help them enhance the quality and cost- 
effectiveness of their indigent defense systems. In addition, TIDC was given a 
crucial information-gathering function. In an environment where it had been 
difficult to get even rudimentary facts concerning local expenditures and practices, 
the new legislation required counties to report pertinent details annually to TIDC, 
in order to facilitate planning and measures to improve indigent defense services. 
With an annual operating budget of approximately $48 million,
109 
TIDC 
provides direct grants to county-level indigent-defense programs.   Much of the 
money is allocated in accordance with a pre-defined formula, but TIDC also 
controls discretionary grants, which it can use to encourage innovation and reform 
at the county level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107 There are scattered exceptions. For example, in 2013, Wichita County  (population 
132,057) used a public defender to represent 42% of its 2,713 indigent criminal defendants. See 
Travis County Dashboard, supra note 105. 
108 For discussion of the legislative controversy that led to the establishment of the Texas 
Indigent Defense Commission, see Laurin, supra note 96, at 20–21. 
109 See TEXAS  INDIGENT  DEFENSE  COMMISSION, OPERATING  BUDGET  FOR  FISCAL  YEAR 
2014,  (2013),  available  at  http://tidc.texas.gov/media/21582/operating-budget_tidc_fy14.pdf  (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2014). 
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C. The Comal County Pilot Program 
 
1. Background 
 
In September 2010, a client-choice proposal inspired  by free-market 
principles was put forward in a CATO Institute policy paper.
110 TIDC’s executive 
director, Jim Bethke, took notice and sought to find an appropriate venue in which 
to test the idea—one large enough to offer relevant lessons, but small enough to 
permit outreach and explanation of the unfamiliar concept to all significant 
stakeholders. Bethke quickly identified Comal County as a suitable, mid-sized 
jurisdiction, and initiated the personal contacts necessary to convince the county’s 
judges and key members of the local bar to accept and willingly support the 
project. 
TIDC’s operating environment makes it impossible for its leadership to 
promote reform through “top-down” pronouncements or logically persuasive 
position papers. Instead, everything it seeks to accomplish must of necessity win 
the voluntary support of independent judges and other local officials who enjoy 
autonomy with regard to indigent defense policy in their own jurisdictions. 
Personal one-on-one contact, carefully cultivated trust, and individual “buy-in” 
from every interested party therefore have been indispensable. Winning local 
endorsement for client choice was no exception. 
That said, the concept of client choice apparently did not prove exceptionally 
difficult to sell—perhaps because Texas has never sought to funnel the lion’s share 
of its indigent defense cases to an institutional public defender, or perhaps because 
the political climate is not intrinsically skeptical of free-market alternatives to 
government-run services. 
Another reason for the lack of significant resistance to client choice may have 
been that Comal, like any jurisdiction with a well-run assigned counsel program, 
already had much of the necessary infrastructure in place. The county has an 
established system for screening attorney eligibility for appointment on the basis of 
qualifications and reputation; it has a procedure for regularly monitoring attorney 
performance and removing unqualified lawyers from the list; and the judges are 
already accustomed to reviewing attorney compensation requests, to protect 
against excessive or unjustified fee submissions. 
Moreover, under the conditions already in place, client choice would not 
appear to threaten the personal interests of key stakeholders. The Comal judges, 
unlike their counterparts in Harris County (Houston) and other counties throughout 
Texas, long ago converted their attorney assignment system to automatic 
appointment by rotation, so that they apparently do not seek to retain personal 
control over the flow of indigent defense business to particular attorneys. And 
prominent indigent defense practitioners seem to feel that client choice could work 
 
 
 
110 SCHULHOFER & FRIEDMAN, REFORMING INDIGENT DEFENSE, supra note 21. 
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to their benefit. Many seem confident that their reputation for zealous advocacy 
can prevent a significant loss of clientele and apparently were attracted to the 
prospect that a healthier attorney-client relationship might result when indigent 
defendants requested their services instead of being assigned to them by the 
court.
111
 
2. The Setting112 
 
Located in a semi-rural and recreational area roughly midway between Austin 
and San Antonio, and with a 2013 population estimated at 116,524, Comal County 
can be considered a mid-sized Texas jurisdiction. Its indigent defense docket 
(1,495 cases in 2013), though small by the standard of many American 
jurisdictions, places it well above the Texas median; almost 80% of Texas’s 254 
counties had fewer than 1,000 indigent criminal cases in 2013.
113
 
Like all Texas counties, Comal maintains separate court systems for juvenile 
cases and for misdemeanors (tried in its two County Courts at Law) and felonies 
(tried in its four District Courts). The 2013 docket of 1,495 indigent  cases 
consisted of 523 non-capital felonies,
114 
860 misdemeanors, 111 juvenile cases and 
one appeal, all of which were handled by assigned counsel. The county has six 
active judges who handle adult criminal cases, one for each of the District and 
County courts. 
Prior to implementation of the client-choice initiative, lawyers assigned to 
indigent defendants were selected from one of three lists. List A consists of 
attorneys approved to handle any felony case.  List B includes lawyers eligible to 
 
 
 
 
111  In one recent news report on the Comal project, Texas criminal defense attorney Mitch 
Adams noted that in existing systems for assigning counsel to the indigent “[t]here can be a level of 
distrust there,” and said that the new system, could push attorneys to earn an indigent defendant's 
business.  “I think that it's going to primarily boil down to a lawyer's reputation.  Believe me, lawyers 
have reputations in the county detention centers and places like that.”  See Holly Gonzalez, E. Texas 
legal   experts   weigh   new   indigent   defense   system,   KLTV   (Jan.   6,   2015,   9:30   PM), 
http://www.kltv.com/story/27777564/e-texas-legal-experts-weigh-new-indigent-defense-system. 
Similarly, Texas criminal defense attorney Bobby Mims said that the theory behind the new program 
is that “we're going to have more satisfied defendants. They're going to be able to hire their own 
lawyer, so therefore they should be better pleased with their outcome.”  Id. 
112  Except as otherwise noted, all data and other information in this section are drawn from 
Texas Indigent Defense Commission, Comal County Dashboard, 
http://tidc.tamu.edu/public.net/Pages/CountyDashboard.aspx?cn=Comal (last visited Oct. 12, 2014) 
[hereinafter Comal County Dashboard], and from the author’s discussions with Norman Lefstein, 
Edwin Colfax, Jim Bethke, and knowledgeable local officials. 
113    See Texas Indigent Defense Commission, Indigent Defense Expenditure Report Results: 
Total Indigent Defense Costs and Cases for 
2013, http://tidc.tamu.edu/public.net/Reports/ExpenditureReportResults.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 
2015). 
114   Comal County Dashboard, supra note 112.   Capital cases, if any, are handled under a 
regional plan—in the case of Comal, the Third Administrative Judicial Region Death Penalty Plan. 
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represent defendants only on less serious felony charges—either third-degree 
felonies or “state jail” felonies. List C includes lawyers approved only to handle 
misdemeanor cases. Attorneys who wish to take indigent defense assignments 
apply for eligibility, and after screening of their qualifications, approved attorneys 
are added to one of the three lists, but they do not necessarily know which one. 
Judges review the lists periodically and can promote an attorney to a higher list. 
They can also remove a previously approved attorney from a list, although this 
apparently has not happened often. 
In the procedure followed prior to the implementation of client choice, a 
defendant was informed—at first appearance before a judge or magistrate—of his 
right to request the appointment of counsel if he could afford to retain his own 
lawyer. The defendant was given an application form on which, after detailing his 
income and assets, he could sign a request for the court to appoint counsel. But 
unlike many Texas counties, Comal did not give the judge a role in selecting the 
attorney to be appointed. When a defendant qualified as indigent, the judge or 
magistrate forwarded his application form to the office of the court administrator 
for the district or county court, which then selected an attorney from the 
appropriate list and notified the attorney of his or her appointment to the case. 
Attorney compensation was (and still is) governed by a published fee 
schedule, but rates are stated in wide ranges rather than in specific dollar amounts 
per case or per hour.  Thus, in a felony case, the scheduled fee is $500 to $650 for 
a guilty plea and $400 to $750 per day for a jury or bench trial; compensation for 
other services is at rates of $50 to $100 per hour for in-court time and $50 to $80 
for out-of-court time.
115 
Judges must approve assigned-counsel vouchers, and in 
felony cases they have wide discretion to select the compensation rate they 
consider appropriate within the authorized range.
116 
In misdemeanor cases, the 
schedule fee for a guilty plea is either $250 or $300 per case, depending on the 
seriousness of the charge; other services in-court or out-of-court are compensated 
at the same rates as those paid in felony cases.
117 
Actual  compensation  for 
assigned attorneys has been quite low, averaging $671 per case for felonies and 
 
 
 
115   Compensation for felony appeals is at a rate of $60 per hour, with a minimum of $500 and 
a maximum of $7,500.  Order Adopting Local Rules for Appointment of Counsel in Criminal Cases 
and  Schedule of Fees  for  Payment  of Compensation  to  Appointed  Counsel  (2013) [hereinafter 
COMAL DISTRICT COURT ATTORNEY FEE SCHEDULE], available at 
http://tidc.tamu.edu/IDPlanDocuments/Comal/Comal%20District%20Court%20Attorney%20Fee%2 
0Schedule.pdf. 
116   The current reporting system for fees paid permits an accounting of the amount of the fee 
paid to each attorney in each case, but because the hours or days billed do not appear on the voucher 
when it is sent for payment, there is little transparency in ascertaining actual compensation rates or 
the criteria judges use in setting them. COMAL COUNTY COURT PLAN (2015), available at 
http://tidc.tamu.edu/IDPlan/ViewPlan.aspx?PlanID=409. 
117   Compensation for misdemeanor appeals is at a rate of $60 per hour, with a minimum of 
$500 and a maximum of $2,500.   COMAL  COUNTY  ATTORNEYS  FEE  SCHEDULE, available via 
http://tidc.tamu.edu/public.net/Reports/FeeDocuments.aspx#C. 
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$241 per case for misdemeanors in 2013;
118 
the latter figure is even lower than the 
scheduled minimum fee for a guilty plea to the least serious misdemeanor.
119
 
Also relevant to the financial picture is the convicted defendant’s obligation to 
reimburse the county for the costs of his defense, to the extent he is able to do 
so.
120 
The reimbursement obligation is taken seriously in Comal, as it is 
throughout Texas.
121 
In 2013, defendants paid back more than $87,000, 
representing over 13% of the total cost of indigent defense in that year.
122
 
3. Implementation of Client-Choice123 
 
It would not appear very difficult to move from the pre-choice system to one 
in which the defendant makes the decision about which attorney will be assigned 
to his case. At the point where a court administrator would pick a lawyer’s name 
from a list of those eligible, the defendant would simply pick the name instead. In 
practice, however, the mechanics of making this shift required far more thought 
than the theory of client choice would have predicted. 
When court officials are accustomed to taking particular steps at particular 
times, using particular, carefully drafted forms to do so, considerable precision is 
required to assure that the steps taken remain apt, that cases are not sidetracked, 
and that the forms employed continue to provide defendants and relevant court 
officials with accurate information.  Paperwork must continue to flow in an orderly 
 
 
 
 
118   For Comal’s lone indigent appeal in 2013, assigned counsel was paid a fee of $4,100. 
119   The low average per case may be a consequence of the way that guilty plea representation 
is compensated when a defendant faces multiple charges. Such matters apparently are counted as 
multiple “cases”; the scheduled fee is either $250 or $300 for the first such “case” but only $50 for 
each additional “case.” COMAL COUNTY ATTORNEYS FEE SCHEDULE, supra note 116. 
120   See supra text accompanying notes 66–68. 
121 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.05(g) (Vernon 2011) (“If the court determines that a 
defendant has financial resources that enable him to offset in part or in whole the costs of the legal 
services provided . . . the court shall order the defendant to pay during the pendency of the charges or, 
if convicted, as court costs the amount that it finds the defendant is able to pay.”); see also Curry v. 
Wilson, 853 S.W.2d 40, 46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (“Texas has a significant interest in assuring that 
persons with the financial resources to pay for their own representation do not take a free ride at the 
expense of its taxpayers.”); but cf. Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) 
(holding that an order to repay fees for appointed attorney is invalid if trial court fails to determine 
that the defendant was able to pay those fees). TIDC reports that in 2010 some Texas counties 
recouped up to 63% of their indigent defense costs. TEXAS INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSION, 
ORDERS FOR REPAYMENT OF APPOINTED ATTORNEY COSTS UNDER CODE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
ARTICLE 26.05(G) 1, available at http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/16676/Attorney-Fee- 
Recoupment-Procedures-and-Orders.docx (last visited May 26, 2015). 
122 Some of the reimbursement no doubt pertained to indigent defense fees paid in a prior year, 
but since total indigent defense costs have risen very slowly, the reimbursement rate is roughly the 
same if amounts reimbursed are taken as a percentage of the prior year’s indigent defense outlays. 
123 For the options described in this section, I am substantially indebted to conversations with 
TIDC, the Justice Management Institute, and Norman Lefstein. 
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manner through the system, and other ministerial but important processes must 
continue to function smoothly. 
Most complexities of this sort involve the kind of one-time start-up costs that 
do not, in themselves, present a significant obstacle to changing the status quo; 
such difficulties presumably would diminish substantially or vanish altogether in 
jurisdictions that sought to profit from the tools and experience that a pilot project 
can generate. Nonetheless, this section first considers these purely mechanical 
aspects of implementation, to give some flavor of the formal details that require 
care and attention. 
Following that introduction, this section turns to substantive concerns and in 
particular to three nettlesome issues—the restrictions (if any) on which attorneys 
the indigent clients will be permitted to pick; the information (if any) about eligible 
attorneys that the court and other sources will be able to convey to indigent 
defendants, especially to those held in custody; and the time constraints (if any) 
that indigent defendants will be required to respect in making their choices. In all 
three respects, practical considerations exert a pull away from approaches that 
would be appropriate not only in a pure “free-market” transaction but even in the 
regulated market that governs the relationship between a lawyer and a non-indigent 
client. 
 
i. The Mechanics 
 
At first appearance in Comal County, a person arrested on a felony charge 
generally appears before a magistrate at the county jail. Misdemeanor arrestees 
may likewise have their first appearance before a magistrate or may instead be 
arraigned before a judge in the County Court at Law.
124 
In either case, Texas law 
requires that at the time of first appearance, the arrestee must be advised of his 
rights and informed that he has the “right to request the appointment of counsel if 
the person cannot afford counsel.”125 
Prior to implementation of client choice, the Comal courts used two forms for 
that purpose. The first, a “Magistrate’s Warning,” advised the defendant that if he 
meets the indigency standard, counsel will be appointed for him if he so wishes. 
The second form (“Application of Indigence and Request for Appointment of 
Counsel”) called for the information necessary to determine indigency and 
provided a place for the defendant to sign the statement that “I hereby request the 
Court to appoint counsel to me.” When a defendant who meets the indigency 
standard signed this request, the latter form was forwarded to the Office of Court 
 
 
 
124 Similarly, when a felony defendant is arrested pursuant to a warrant, the warrant typically 
specifies the bond required to qualify for pretrial release, and if the defendant makes bond promptly, 
he will be released immediately, and his first appearance therefore will be before a judge of the 
District Court. Criminal District Attorney - Case Handling, COMAL COUNTY, 
http://www.co.comal.tx.us/CDA/Case_Handling.htm (last visited May 26, 2015). 
125   TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.17(a) (Vernon 2009). 
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Administration, which then selected a qualified attorney from the appropriate list 
and notified the attorney of the appointment. 
A client-choice program clearly will require modification of both forms. For 
example, because many indigent defendants have had experience with the no- 
choice approach, either in Comal County or elsewhere, it would seem prudent to 
communicate clearly to all defendants the fact that the familiar no-choice system 
was no longer operative. Accordingly, the Magistrate’s Warning presumably must 
be modified to draw specific attention to the new regime, by stressing that the 
defendants will be able to choose their own lawyer and that the court will select an 
attorney only when a defendant prefers not to do so. 
The second form presumably will require more extensive changes. This 
second form (“Application of Indigence and Request for Appointment of 
Counsel”) had previously provided indigent defendants who wanted representation 
only one option (“I hereby request the Court to appoint counsel …”). A revised 
form presumably will have to make clear that in the new approach, defendants will 
have three distinct options. First, a defendant who wants to choose his own lawyer 
and knows of one or more whom he likes will need a place on the form to list the 
names of those lawyers in order of preference. Alternatively, for the defendant 
who wants to choose his own lawyer but does not know the name of any particular 
attorney whom he prefers, the form presumably will have to have a place where 
the presiding magistrate or judge can insert the date and time by which the 
defendant must make his choice and report it back to the court. Finally, for the 
defendant who does not want to choose his own lawyer, the form will have to 
retain the usual option for the defendant to request that the court appoint counsel 
for him. 
After a defendant selects one of the three options, the appointment process 
will no doubt require procedural steps beyond those that were sufficient before. Of 
course, if the defendant asks the court to appoint counsel for him or if he declines 
to make any choice, the magistrate or judge who presides at first appearance will 
presumably send the paperwork to the Office of Court Administration, which will 
then assign counsel to the case according to the usual pre-choice procedure. But if 
the defendant indicates the name of the lawyer(s) he wants to choose, the presiding 
officer presumably will have to verify that at least one of the lawyers named is on 
the list of attorneys eligible to be appointed. If so, the presiding official 
presumably would send the paperwork to the Office of Court Administration, so 
that the first of the available lawyers on the defendant’s list can be appointed. If 
none of the lawyers whom the defendant names is eligible for appointment, the 
presiding judge or magistrate presumably would have to inform the defendant to 
that effect, so that the defendant could provide additional attorney names or select 
one of the other options. 
The paperwork and procedures presumably will have to become even more 
detailed when a defendant wants to exercise the choice option but does not know 
the name of any particular attorney whom he wants to choose. In that case the 
presiding  magistrate  or  judge  will  first  have  to  set  a  time  within  which  the 
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defendant must make his choice and inform the court of the name of the attorney 
he has chosen.
126 
In addition, the presiding officer presumably will have to give 
the defendant the names of the attorneys eligible and available for appointment and 
will have to explain in clear terms where the defendant will be able to get 
information about each of those lawyers.
127 
Finally, the presiding officer will have 
to make sure that the defendant has access to a form that will enable him to list, in 
order of preference, the names of the lawyers (up to a certain maximum) whom he 
has decided to choose. If the defendant communicates those choices to the court 
within the applicable time limit, the court presumably would forward that 
paperwork to the Office of Court Administration, so that the first of the available 
lawyers on the defendant’s list can be appointed. But if the defendant does not 
make a selection within the allotted time, the court presumably would have to 
notify the Office of Court Administration accordingly, so that counsel can be 
assigned to the case (presumably according to the usual pre-choice procedure) 
within the time limits allowed under Texas law. 
 
ii. Attorney Eligibility 
 
Legal services are not provided in an entirely free market, of course, because 
representation is restricted to attorneys in good standing who have been admitted 
to the local bar. Subject to that restriction, however, a client with the means to 
retain counsel can hire any lawyer admitted to practice in the jurisdiction. 
Attorneys who represent indigent defendants, however, are typically chosen from a 
pre-determined list of those whom judges or court officials consider competent to 
serve, and, as previously described,
128 
this has long been the practice in Comal 
County. A key threshold question in implementing client choice is whether to 
limit client-choice to attorneys eligible for appointment in the prior system, or 
instead to put indigents in a position identical to that of non-indigent defendants, 
by permitting them to select any attorney admitted to the bar. 
The underlying principle of client choice pushes strongly in the latter 
direction (permitting indigents to select any lawyer admitted to the bar), but there 
are practical reasons to consider modifying that approach. For example, the local 
bar, though generally supportive of the pilot project, noted that client-choice could 
prove unworkable in cases involving alleged sexual abuse of children.
129     
Such 
 
 
 
126   For  explanation  of  the  deadline  for  exercising  the  choice  option,   see  infra  text 
accompanying note 139. 
127   For  explanation  of  how  information  about  eligible  attorneys  is  communicated  to 
defendants, see infra text accompanying notes 136–39. 
128   See supra pp. 55–56. 
129   E.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.02 (Vernon 2011) (Continuous Sexual Abuse of Young 
Child or Children); 21.11 (Indecency with a Child)); 21.12 (Improper Relationship Between Educator 
and Student) 22.011 (2) (Sexual Assault of a Child); and 22.021(a)(1)(B) (Aggravated Sexual Assault 
of a Child). 
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cases can be exceptionally time-consuming and emotionally draining. The lawyers 
pointed out that in a client-choice system, any lawyer who successfully represented 
a defendant in such a case would soon find himself or herself selected over and 
over by defendants facing similar charges. Yet the lawyers who accept indigent 
defense appointments would not want to be appointed again soon in another case 
involving alleged sexual abuse of a child. Accordingly, there is good reason to 
eliminate the client-choice option for this one category of extraordinarily difficult 
cases.
130 
With respect to all other cases on the docket, theory would suggest 
attempting to approximate a pure “free market” by permitting indigent defendants 
to select any attorney admitted to the bar. But many local stakeholders expressed 
concern that this approach might bring into the system large numbers of 
incompetent lawyers or those unfamiliar with local practice.
131
 
In addition, the “any-lawyer” approach could become a source of drastic 
delay. Defendants would need considerable time to gather information about a list 
of lawyers that could potentially extend to all members of the bar.  And even after 
a defendant had informed himself, he would not know which of these lawyers were 
actually willing to accept indigent cases for payment under the county’s fee 
schedule. The “any-lawyer” approach could produce a situation in which 
defendants might be repeatedly rebuffed by attorneys unwilling to take on their 
cases, and such defendants could in turn become quite frustrated. Even if the 
choice option did not backfire in that way, a defendant’s lack of immediate success 
in locating a willing attorney presumably would require repeated continuances 
until a lawyer-client relationship could be established. Such delay would disrupt 
the court docket under the best of circumstances, and (absent some procedural 
work-around) would run afoul of Texas’s requirement that counsel for indigent 
defendants be appointed, at the latest, within three business days of first 
appearance.
132
 
Accordingly, there appear to be strong practical reasons to  permit  client 
choice only within the parameters of the already-established attorney-eligibility 
lists. In that event, indigent defendants would receive at their first appearance the 
list of attorneys eligible for appointment in their case.
133 
Presumably, attorneys 
who are temporarily unable to accept new cases would inform the Office of Court 
Administration to that effect, so that their names could be temporarily removed 
 
 
 
 
130 Capital murder cases obviously present great difficulty as well, but they would not be 
eligible for the Comal County client-choice program in any event, because counsel for indigent 
capital defendants are assigned through regional appointment process outside the framework of the 
Comal County indigent defense plan. 
131 As a recreational area that draws from nearby Austin and San Antonio, Comal often has 
indigent defendant from neighboring counties who, in a regime of unrestricted choice, might well 
select an attorney from outside Comal. 
132   TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 1.051.  For further discussion of the timing issue, see 
infra text accompanying note 139–40. 
133   See supra text accompanying note 127. 
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from the list; their names could be restored when they inform the court that they 
are once again able to accept appointments. 
This approach would guarantee that any attorney chosen by the indigent 
defendant will be no less competent (on average) than the attorney who would 
have been appointed under a no-choice system. Because all attorneys on the list 
are by definition well-qualified (in the judgment of court officials), the use of the 
pre-screened list would obviate the frequently voiced objection that ill-informed 
defendants in a client-choice system will make poor choices or be exploited by 
unscrupulous attorneys trolling for indigent defense business.
134 
And because all 
attorneys on the list would be willing to accept indigent appointments, the pre- 
screened list, continuously updated, would ensure that defendants could not “all 
flock to one lawyer.”135 
 
iii. Informed Choice 
 
In the ordinary market for legal services, including criminal defense services, 
the non-indigent client is largely on his own in seeking to gather information about 
the competence and comparative strengths of different lawyers, as well as their 
likely cost. Lawyer advertising and bar association websites may provide some 
resources, but these are typically quite limited. A defendant’s prior experience (if 
any), word of mouth, and (perhaps) a pre-retention interview with an attorney who 
is under consideration are the prospective client’s only guides. However 
imperfect, this is the world that consumers of legal services, like all other 
consumers, typically must navigate. 
This approach offers many attractions in a client-choice system: It gets court 
officials out of the business of determining how much information to provide and 
avoids any need for them to screen it for accuracy; it also places the indigent 
defendant in exactly the same position as the defendant of means, at least in theory. 
Again, however, practical considerations can make this approach complicated or 
unworkable. Defendants remanded to jail, as many indigent defendants are,
136 
have limited ability to make phone calls, access the internet or consult with family 
or friends.   Family may have limited opportunity to gather information on the 
 
 
 
 
134   See supra text accompanying notes 84–90. 
135   United States v. Ely, 719 F.2d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1983) (advancing this objection to a 
client-choice option). 
136   In principle, eligibility for release on bond and eligibility for appointment of counsel are 
separate issues; indeed Texas law mandates that the official who makes the indigency determination 
“may not consider whether the defendant has posted or is capable of posting bail, except to the extent 
that [this] reflects the defendant’s financial circumstances as measured by the [permissible] 
considerations listed in this subsection [i.e., the defendant’s income, assets, financial responsibilities, 
etc.].” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04(m) (Vernon 2014). In practice, however, defendants 
who post bail typically do not qualify for appointed counsel, and conversely, those who do qualify 
typically fail to make bail, at least initially. 
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defendant’s behalf. And meanwhile the clock is ticking, because as mentioned,137 
Texas law requires that counsel for the indigent be appointed within three business 
days following first appearance. 
These concerns suggest the value of some limited degree of court involvement 
in compiling relevant information. One readily workable alternative would be for 
officials to compile a notebook containing basic information about each attorney 
eligible for appointment. Separate color-coded notebooks could be compiled for 
each of the A, B and C Lists, with pages removed when individual attorneys 
declare themselves temporarily unavailable and then re-inserted when such 
attorneys report that they are once again willing to accept appointments. 
This approach, however, precipitates a difficult decision concerning the level 
of detail that the notebooks should provide. In principle, the more information, the 
better. It therefore might seem that eligible attorneys should be free to provide 
whatever information they deem appropriate about themselves, their experience, 
and their philosophy of representation. Indeed, the need for comprehensive 
information is heightened by the fact that—given the low rates of indigent defense 
compensation—many attorneys might be unwilling to make time for a pre- 
selection client interview at the jail or even at their offices (for defendants not 
detained prior to trial). 
Nonetheless, a thick notebook binder containing detailed information of this 
sort could quickly prove unmanageable or frustrating to defendants. If  each 
indigent defendant is to be given his own thick binder, dozens of binders might 
have to be available at any one time. But that merely logistical problem would be 
less of an obstacle than the concern that a conventional ring binder could prove 
dangerous in the hands of a jail inmate who might easily fashion it into a weapon if 
he were allowed to take the binder back to his own cell. Practical considerations 
therefore weigh heavily against giving each indigent defendant his own copy of 
such a binder; defendants presumably would need to consult the county’s own 
copy (or copies) at the courthouse before release on bond or at the jail if remanded 
to custody. 
A system affording defendants a place to consult a County-maintained 
information binder seems sensible, but it raises further questions. The Comal 
County jail has a “Library” suitable for inmates to use for this purpose, but the 
room can accommodate only a maximum of five inmates at a time. Jail officials 
presumably could allow inmates to make notes from the binder, but given the 
limited number of inmates who can use the library at any one time, some time limit 
inevitably would have to be imposed - for example, allowing each inmate no more 
than about twenty minutes at a time to examine the appropriate binder in the 
Library. The limited space and time that could be made available for consulting 
the information binders then makes it imperative to present the relevant 
information  in  a  concise  format.    The  need  for  selectivity in  the  information 
 
 
 
137   See infra text accompanying note 139. 
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presented is compounded, moreover, by the fact that for security reasons, attorney 
information sheets longer than one page for each attorney presumably would have 
to be discouraged, in order to avoid the need for staples or paper clips - again, a 
security concern with respect to defendants detained prior to trial. 
Under these conditions, the amount of information that can be provided to 
defendants in custody is likely to prove far from ideal.  A plausible compromise, 
for example, would be an approach in which each sheet would contain only basic 
information provided by the attorney in question: Name, office address, email 
address,
138  
internet website (if any), law school attended, year of graduation, year 
of admission to the Texas bar and whether any disciplinary charges have been 
upheld or are currently pending.  The sheet could provide a place for the attorney 
to indicate the percentage of practice devoted to indigent criminal defense and to 
all criminal cases, and the number of bench and jury trials in which the attorney 
has personally participated.   Finally, a small space (a few lines) could be made 
available for the attorney to explain why he or she accepts the cases of criminal 
defendants who are unable to afford to hire their own lawyer.   In addition, of 
course,  defendants  in  custody  are  in  close  contact  with  fellow  inmates  who 
presumably will already have met their attorney and, in some cases, will already 
have an impression of how their attorney handled their case through to completion. 
Whether  constraints  on  the  amount  of  information  provided  and  the 
conditions for consulting it will drain the client-choice option of value in the eyes 
of indigent defendants necessarily remains to be seen.  It seems plausible to hope, 
however,  that  despite  such  limitations,  client  choice  can  nonetheless  afford 
indigent defendants a feeling of greater control over their cases and greater trust in 
their attorneys than they would have in the absence of any choice at all. 
 
iv. Time Limitations on the Exercise of Choice 
 
Under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, when an indigent defendant 
requests the appointment of counsel, “a court or the court’s designee . . . shall 
appoint counsel . . . not later than the end of the third working day after the date on 
which the court or the court’s designee receives the defendant’s request for 
appointment of counsel.”139 The allowable time is clearly too short for extensive 
research into attorney reputation or for a series of pre-selection interviews. For 
that reason, a jurisdiction committed to client choice could conceivably decide 
either to amend that kind of rule, allow the defendant to waive the three-day limit, 
or find a flexible way to interpret the timing of the “request for counsel” that starts 
the three-day period running. On the other hand, many  judges  and  criminal 
defense  practitioners  strongly  believe  that  prompt  appointment  of  counsel  is 
 
 
 
138   It might prove desirable to omit the attorney’s phone number, because attorneys often are 
unwilling to accept collect calls from defendants in custody. 
139   TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 1.051 (Vernon 2007). 
2015] 555 CLIENT CHOICE 
 
 
 
imperative  and  therefore  that  the  allowable  time  period  should  be  short  and 
unwaivable. 
Once that choice is made, defendants inevitably will have only a limited 
window in which to gather information and make their selection. A tight time 
limit insures that if a defendant proves unable to select his preferred attorney 
promptly, the court will still have time to make the attorney appointment itself, 
under pre-choice procedures, without running afoul of the three-day limit. 
Arguably, defendants should be afforded only 24 hours to make their selection, in 
order to leave maximum flexibility for appointment by the Office of Court 
Administration, should that prove necessary. But because such a narrow window 
would undercut the goal of affording defendants a genuine sense of choice, it 
would presumably be more prudent, and yet sufficiently workable, to allow 
defendants 48 hours to exercise the choice option. 
To implement such an arrangement, defendants who are released pending trial 
presumably will have to be instructed to return their attorney-selection form, filled 
out with the names of their preferred attorneys, by the 48 hour deadline, so that the 
Office of Court Administration can appoint the first of the selected attorneys who 
is able to serve. If a defendant released before trial fails to return his attorney- 
selection form in time, the court presumably would then have to assign an attorney 
in accordance with the ordinary pre-choice procedure. 
The process for defendants remanded to jail presumably would be similar. 
Detained defendants would be instructed to return their completed attorney- 
selection form to a designated official at the jail by the 48 hour deadline. 
However, if a defendant makes bond and qualifies for release before the deadline 
expires, the completed form presumably should be collected when he is discharged 
from custody or—if his choice has not yet been made—the defendant presumably 
would have to be instructed to return a completed form to the court within the 
allotted time. Like defendants released before trial, a defendant in detention who 
fails to complete and return his attorney-selection form by the applicable deadline 
would be assigned an attorney in accordance with the ordinary pre-choice 
procedure. 
As in the case of the constraints on the amount of information provided, the 
limitations on the time available for selecting an attorney could conceivably foster 
resentment among indigent defendants and undercut some of the promise of the 
client-choice approach. But indigent defendants detained prior to trial presumably 
will have a strong incentive to gather information about attorneys right away and 
complete their selection forms promptly. Many of the local Comal County 
stakeholders are optimistic that indigent defendants will view the chance to choose 
their lawyer as an option of real value. It remains to be seen, however, whether or 
to what extent a less favorable perception outcome will materialize among indigent 
clients. 
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4. Evaluation of Client-Choice 
 
In order to assess the impact of client choice on indigent clients, on the 
attorney-client relationship and on the justice system as a whole, the pilot project 
includes a plan for collecting data about case management and client perceptions 
of the process, with respect to both cases initiated before the choice option went 
live and those initiated in the new regime where client-choice is to be available. In 
addition to recording variables pertaining to case outcome, processing times and 
costs for assigned-counsel representation, the survey will ask all defendants a 
series of questions designed to elicit measures of attorney commitment and 
effort.
140
 
Data will be collected, for example, concerning such relatively objective 
matters as how soon and how often defendants’ lawyers met with them; whether 
their lawyer returned their calls quickly and met with them when asked; whether 
the lawyer took time to get to know them; and whether the lawyer asked their 
opinion about the case. The survey will also pose questions to draw out subjective 
impressions of attorney performance, not only defendants’ overall satisfaction with 
the representation they were afforded, but also whether they felt their lawyer 
worked hard; took time to listen to them; explained clearly what was happening 
and kept them informed; took their opinions into account; and treated them with 
respect. Finally, data will also be collected to probe defendants’ perceptions of the 
justice system in general: for example, whether they feel that judges and courts can 
be trusted and whether they think people should accept judicial decisions even 
when they disagree with them. 
It should soon prove possible to determine with some degree of empirical 
certainty whether the theoretical merits of client-choice are borne out in practice in 
the setting of a court system like that of Comal County. 
 
IV. LOOKING FORWARD 
 
A rigorous assessment of all costs and benefits of client choice in Comal 
County will necessarily have to await completion of the ambitious plan of data 
collection and analysis mandated by TIDC. Even before that verdict is in, 
however, the initial implementation efforts in Comal should already suffice to put 
to rest one of the principal reservations about a client choice regime—the concern 
that it will necessitate overly complex paperwork and case processing measures. 
The preceding discussion of the necessary implementation measures and the policy 
decisions to be made with respect to them demonstrates that there is nothing 
intrinsically infeasible about a client choice option in indigent defense.  Indeed, the 
 
 
 
140 Defendants whose cases are initiated after the choice option goes into effect will also be 
asked whether they found it easy to get adequate information about the attorneys who were available 
and whether they found it easy to decide which attorney they wanted. 
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foregoing suggestions concerning the pertinent paperwork and case flow details, 
the procedures for furnishing information to indigent defendants and the steps 
necessary for defendants to exercise and communicate their choice provide a 
template that can readily be adapted and adopted elsewhere. 
In two respects, the Comal setting differs in potentially significant ways from 
that of many other American jurisdictions. First, average attorney fees per case 
have been quite low.
141 
Accordingly, private attorneys may be less strongly 
motivated in Comal than elsewhere to seek and retain indigent clients. To that 
extent, whatever benefits for clients ultimately result from Comal’s client-choice 
regime, it would be plausible to expect even greater benefits in jurisdictions where 
defense attorneys for the indigent are more generously compensated. 
A second difference has more complex implications. As a jurisdiction that 
makes no use of a public defender, Comal does not face a prospect that many 
supporters of indigent defense and county officials elsewhere fear—that a choice 
option will trigger headlong flight of indigent clients away from representation by 
highly competent public defenders. Nonetheless, that prospect does not by any 
means represent a flaw in the client-choice model. First, making choice available 
might demonstrate that such fears are groundless. If client flight did not 
materialize, we would have a clear sign that public defenders were succeeding in 
one of their primary missions—either because they had been doing so all along or 
because the choice option served in itself to enhance their performance and the 
trust of their clients. Conversely, even if flight were to occur, that outcome would 
not indicate any weakness in the client-choice principle. To the contrary, to 
attribute client flight to defects in the choice concept would be equivalent to 
blaming the messenger for bad news. Client flight triggered by the opt-out 
opportunity afforded to indigents in a client-choice regime would provide a vivid 
measure of dissatisfaction or mistrust among public defender clients and a strong 
signal that they, themselves, felt their interests would be better represented in a 
different counsel-assignment system. 
Even while we await final analysis of the “before” and “after” data generated 
by the Comal project, therefore, it is not too soon for officials responsible for 
indigent defense elsewhere to begin considering the possibility of instituting a 
client-choice model in their own jurisdictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
141   See supra text accompanying notes 116–20. 
